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ABSTRACT
Northrop Grumman Newport News is committed to implementing lean on the enterprise
level. This thesis is focused around work toward creating a global, high-level information
and material value stream map for a specified pipe assembly. It identifies the largest areas
of waste in the value stream and their root causes. The recommendations assist with the
reduction and elimination of the major time delays, inventory buildups, re-work, excessive
processes and other waste in the system. The pipe assembly chosen as the basis for the
enterprise value stream map is part of a system, newly developed for the current aircraft
carrier. The pipe assembly is representative of other pipe assemblies fabricated in the
shipyard, so challenges experienced with the manufacturing and flow of the selected
assembly are likely to be seen in many other pipe assemblies in the facility.
A large number of assemblies was examined to determine the root causes of delivery
problems. The analysis was based on the criticality of the ship need date. The root causes
for the late assembly delivery were found to be inadequate material inventory levels in the
warehouses, lack of fabrication timeline coordination between fabrication shops, late
engineering drawing revisions, underestimated fabrication durations, late supplier delivery,
late material purchase order placement, and lost material.
Suggestions are provided to improve operational efficiencies by targeting the elimination
of these root causes that result in the delay of assembly fabrication. Some include material
ordering process reorganization, shop loading variability elimination, fabrication timeline
alignment, metric realignment, and rework system prioritization. Recommendations for
future work focus are concentrated on the control of the stock material inventory levels,
alignment of the incentives across the enterprise, and reorganization of the planning
processes.
Thesis Supervisors:
Daniel E. Whitney, Senior Research Scientist, Center for Technology, Policy and Industrial
Development
Deborah J. Nightingale, Professor of Aeronautics & Astronautics & Engineering Systems Division
Donald Rosenfield, Senior Lecturer, Director, Fellows Program, Leaders for Manufacturing
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1. Background
1.1 Northrop Grumman Newport News
Northrop Grumman Newport News is the sole designer and supplier of Nimitz class
aircraft carriers as well as nuclear-powered submarines, which are constructed in
conjunction with the Electric Boat Corporation, for the sole customer, the United States
Navy. The shipyard provides overhaul and maintenance services for aircraft carriers,
submarines, and other military and commercial ships. The Newport News Shipbuilding
and Dry Dock Company was originated in 1886 and remained a private company until
Collis Potter Huntington's heirs sold its shares in 1940. In 1969, Tenneco bought the
shipyard and, after 27 years, spun off Newport News Shipbuilding into an independent
company. In 2001, Newport News Shipbuilding merged with Northrop Grumman
Corporation and currently represents one of the company's seven sectors with annual
revenue of $2.8 billion.
The shipyard is located on 550 acres stretching 2 miles along the James River
waterfront and currently employs approximately 18,000 people, 4,500 of which are
designers and engineers. The shipyard has seven dry docks and one floating dry dock, two
outfitting berths and four outfitting piers, which provide extensive capabilities for building
and maintaining the fleet of aircraft carriers, submarines, and other commercial vessels.
Newport News has a wide range of machining capabilities with 300,000 square feet of
machine shop facilities containing more than 500 machines. Steel production, fabrication,
pipe fabrication, and sheet metal facilities, electrical shop, joiner shop and model shop,
foundry, blast and coat facility are located in the shipyard among other facilities.
Warehousing area covers 1.2 million square feet where about 500,000 inventory items are
stored. Material is moved from receiving to the warehouse via a fleet of 80 trucks and
Newport News' railroad system.
People at Northrop Grumman Newport News are highly trained and skilled in various
trades, many of whom graduated from the 4 year Apprentice School. Fourth and fifth
generations of shipbuilders are found working here. Newport News' motto is 'Great
Company, Great Products, Great People, Great Results'.
11
1.2 Business Environment: US Navy Customer
Northrop Grumman is involved in a variety of defense and commercial programs in the
United States and abroad. The defense industry is characterized by intense competition
and long operating cycles, where Northrop Grumman is the second largest defense
contractor. Northrop Grumman provides products and services through seven business
sectors that include electronic systems and technology, combat aircraft, missiles, and
nuclear and non-nuclear navy ships. The company conducts majority of its business with
the U.S. Government's Department of Defense.
Northrop Grumman Newport News, unlike the other sectors of Northrop Grumman,
does not experience direct competition. No other shipyard in the United States has the
capacity to build aircraft carriers. Electric Boat Corporation and Northrop Grumman
Newport News are the only two companies in the United States who have the ability to
manufacture nuclear powered submarines. The two companies are teaming in the building
of the Virginia class submarines in conjunction with each other, which eliminates
competition. Therefore, Northrop Grumman Newport News has no competition in the
production of nuclear powered submarines and aircraft carries in the United States.
The US Navy enters into a fixed-price contract with Northrop Grumman Newport
News for aircraft carrier construction. The nature of the fixed-price contract allows the
company to gain cost savings, but also exposes the company to the risk of revenue loss due
to excess spending. If the initial calculations used to price the contract are wrong, the
company may lose money on the ship. If the aircraft carrier is late with respect to the US
Navy's expected delivery date, the company experiences decrease in financial profit. The
amount of profit lost is determined based on a financial and schedule overrun according to
the share line, which shows the relationship between cost, schedule, and profit loss/gain.
US Navy finances the construction of the ship through progress payments, which are
provided at various stages of the ship's construction. The payment is based on the
weighted average of the engineering and labor hours spent on the design and fabrication,
and the cost of the material used for the fabrication. US Navy and the shipyard share the
profits, if the ship construction costs less than specified in the contract, and the losses, if
the ship cost overruns are experienced. US Navy expects the shipyard to deliver a quality
aircraft carrier constructed to the specifications in a timely manner.
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1.3 Aircraft Carriers
Aircraft carriers are the largest existing warships in the world. There are 9 operational
Nimitz class aircraft carriers currently serving in the fleet of the US Navy with the last
Nimitz class aircraft carrier currently under construction with the expected delivery date in
2008. Nimitz class aircraft carriers have two nuclear reactors and four shafts, and an
overall length of 1092 feet, width of 252 feet, height of 244 feet, displacement of 97,000
tons, and speed of 30+ knots. Carriers hold approximately 85 aircraft and 5,500 military
Navy personnel.
Construction of an aircraft carrier takes about five years and costs approximately $4.5
billion with the expected life of 50 years with one refueling after 25 years. Aircraft
carriers are constructed modularly using large units (Superlifts) that are placed in the dry
dock and welded together. The ship is made up of 163 superlifts with each superlift
weighing up to 900 tons. Approximately 30,000 light fixtures, 1,325 miles of cable and
wiring, 1 million feet of pipe, 47,000 tons of structural steel and 1 million pounds of
aluminum make up an aircraft carrier. Technological innovations are implemented in
aircraft carriers during the construction making no two aircraft carriers identical.
Figure 1-1: Aircraft Carrier
World Book illustration by Robert Keys From World Book Q 2002 World Book, Inc., 233 N. Michigan Avenue, Suite 2000,
Chicago, IL 60601. All rights reserved.
13
I
1.4 Newport News Shipyard Lean Effort
Northrop Grumman Newport News' vision for Lean methodology is
"to transform the shipyard into a Lean organization so effectively that we will be
recognized as the foremost proponent and practitioner of Lean in the shipbuilding
industry within three years. Lean will be an accepted 'state of mind' and the entire
enterprise will focus on improving customer value by continually improving processes
and eliminating waste. Lean will be recognized as a new and permanent way of
thinking and part of the shipyard culture".
The Road to Lean white paper was created in the beginning of 2003 by the President of the
shipyard to capture the strategy for implementation of and to show the sector's
commitment to Lean.
A number of shops and various departments started implementing lean principles in the
late 1990s. As a result, systems and processes were not standardized and were optimized
on the department level, but not on the enterprise level. When Northrop Grumman
acquired the shipyard in 2001, its commitment to lean influenced and reinforced the
shipyard's lean initiatives. The effort to implement lean on the enterprise level started
with the creation of The Road to Lean document. An environment for successful
implementation of lean has been created through deployment of cross-functional Lean
Implementation Teams with a Lean Implementation Coalition leading the effort. The cross
functional teams were chartered with the development of structures and systems to support
lean.
A number of lean events, Rapid Improvement Workshops, took place in departments of
different areas such as manufacturing, supply chain, logistics, planning, engineering, HR,
and finance. These events were geared towards identifying opportunities for
improvements and determining steps to fix problems and eliminate waste. Some
departments undergo lean qualifications, which are a five-step maturity methodology with
step five being fully lean, to ensure full Lean implementation within the department. Some
departments have developed criteria for step three and are working hard to move towards
Phase III maturity.
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Newport News shipbuilding uses a customized version of the Enterprise Level
Roadmap (Figure 1), developed by MIT's Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI), to guide the
transition to lean. CUrrent efforts Future efforts
Figure 1-2: Roadmap to Lean
COMMITMENT L IMPLEMENTATION AND
TO LE . TTTONALIZ ATION
N DevelopN
Adopt Lean Structure and Focus on the
Paradigm Systems to Value Stream
Support Lean
Decision to
Pursue Focus on Create
Enterprise Continua Implementation
Transformation Improvement Plans
Pilot Lean Implement Lean
Implementation; Projects
"Lean
archipelago"
A customized approach for deployment of the Lean Enterprise Self Assessment Tool
developed at LAI is used to align management on the current state of lean implementation.
Current lean efforts are concentrated on the adaptation of the lean paradigm and
developing structure and systems to support implementation of lean principles. The focus
of the next step is the creation, analysis, improvement, and control of the end-to-end value
stream, which motivated the need for the research that is presented in this thesis.
1.5 Thesis Structure
The structure of this thesis is as follows:
Chapter 1: An overview of Northrop Grumman Newport News, descriptions of the
business environment with the US Navy as a customer, Nimitz class aircraft carriers, and
the shipyard's lean initiative, and an overview of the organization of this thesis.
Chapter 2: Project motivation, scope, goals, objectives, and approach are discussed in this
chapter.
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Chapter 3: Discussion of lean principles, value stream mapping, definitions of waste,
benefits of waste elimination, and application of lean principles in the shipyard.
Chapter 4: Description of the enterprise value stream mapping in the shipyard.
Chapter 5: Discussion of the assembly and detail representation verification in the copper,
steel, and assembly pipe shops.
Chapter 6: Data analysis and problem origin identification. Description of the general
analysis approach and detailed explanation of each problem origin are provided in this
chapter.
Chapter 7: General methodology for conducting value stream maps, which includes
understanding the organization, identifying waste, understanding differences between lean
in high and low volume manufacturing, identifying data sources, conducting analyses, and
performing verification, is discussed in this chapter.
Chapter 8: Discussion of the recommendations, suggestions for the future work and
conclusions.
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2. Problem Statement and Approach
2.1 Project Motivation and Scope
A current thrust in Northrop Grumman Newport News' transition to lean is the creation
of the end-to-end value stream map. The enterprise level value stream map is expected to
assist with the current lack of understanding of the systemic complexities that exist among
interrelating processes throughout the shipyard. There is some anecdotal evidence that
upstream processes cause downstream delays, but very little data to support it. In addition,
systems and processes are currently being improved with the help of lean principles on the
department level, which results in sub-optimization. In order to ensure full optimization of
all the processes in the shipyard, the lean effort needs to be implemented at the enterprise
level as shown in Figure 2-1. The effort will increase operational effectiveness by cost and
waste reductions and improve process flexibility to ensure shorter reaction time to changes.
Figure 2-1: Project Motivation
Sourcing ngineering Planning Logistics Fabrication, onstructior
Current
Lean 4444
Efforts
Future
Lean
Efforts
The results of the project will be used as a basis for the focus of the future lean projects
and initiatives. The project is carried out by an intern who is a student at MIT's Leaders
for Manufacturing (LFM) program in six and a half months.
The scope of the project includes the information and material flow for a pipe
assembly across all the departments of the shipyard starting with engineering and sourcing
and ending with the assembly testing on the aircraft carrier, which is currently under
construction. Information and material movements that deviate from the typical flow are
not included in the high level value stream map, but major time delays caused by these
movements are mentioned and addressed.
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An enterprise level value stream map is created by tracing the movement of material
and information for a pipe assembly through the shipyard. The assembly chosen as a basis
for the value stream map is regarded as representative of most assemblies fabricated in the
shipyard. Movement of other randomly chosen parts and assemblies through the shops are
tracked to ensure the problems seen with the chosen assembly are also found in other
assemblies as well.
2.2 Goals and Objectives
The following are the goals of the enterprise level value stream mapping project:
e Create a global, high level information and material value stream map for the
chosen pipe assembly. The value stream map has to be understandable and provide
useful visual portrayal of the end-to-end value stream.
e Provide detailed analysis of the major problems uncovered by the data gathering
and the value stream map. Identify areas of re-work and inventory buildup and
determine their root causes. Gain better understanding of interactions between
processes that cause problems.
- Assist the shipyard with understanding its operating challenges, process
coordination and synchronization challenges and document insights.
- Provide a set of recommendations to assist with the reduction and elimination of
the major time delays, inventory buildups, re-work, excessive processes and other
waste in the system.
e Develop methodology for mapping and analyzing enterprise level value streams,
assisting the shipyard with advancing its lean capabilities.
2.3 Project Approach
Enterprise level value stream map is the first initiative to capture part of the processes
within the shipyard and their dynamic interactions. Jones and Womack suggest that value
stream mapping is intended to segregate operational issues to the level of specific products,
which are grouped into a product family. A product family is a set of products that
undergo similar processing and use common equipment. In the process of identifying the
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basis for the value stream mapping effort, project sponsor's team considered families of
pipe, valves, and fittings to serve as the basis for the enterprise value stream map of the
shipyard. However, the families of one type of component excluded a number of processes
occurring in the shipyard on regular basis. For example, valves are normally installed
without alterations, thus bypassing most manufacturing processes in the shipyard. A
suitable unit to serve as a basis for the value stream map needs to contain a variety of
equipment and fittings. Therefore, a pipe assembly is chosen to serve as a basis for the
enterprise value stream map.
A pipe assembly consists of valves, fittings, and pipe and flows through a number of
fabrication facilities. Examples of gaskets, valve, and a pipe assembly are shown in Figure
2-2. A pipe assembly was chosen to be traced from 'cradle to grave' because this effort
captures most processes and their interactions taking place in the shipyard. The pipe
assembly can be broken down to and tracked at the detail level, therefore providing a
workable model for the value stream map.
Figure 2-2: Images of Fittings, Valves, and Pipe
Valve Elbow
Gaskets Flange
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Pipe Assembly
Source: www.google.com/images
A pipe assembly for a newly developed system that has never been employed on an
aircraft carrier was chosen as the basis for the enterprise level value stream map. This
assembly, referred to as Assembly I, was selected with the help of two Production
Engineers each with 40 years of experience working in and managing numerous pipe shops
in the shipyard. The engineers believe that Assembly I is representative of most pipe
assemblies fabricated in the shipyard. Thus, challenges experienced with manufacturing
and flow of the selected assembly apply to most pipe assemblies in the facility. Section 6
of this thesis provides data that establishes commonality of the problems experienced with
the chosen assembly with a number of other pipe assemblies fabricated in the shipyard,
showing that Assembly I is representative.
The enterprise level value stream map creation requires extensive data gathering from
every department that is involved with the design, fabrication, and provision of
information to support the manufacturing of the chosen assembly. Interviews were
conducted with a representative from each department to understand his/her involvement
with the chosen assembly and determine touch and process time values. Most data
associated with information and material flow within the pipe and assembly shops was
drawn directly from the Management Resource Planning system (SAP) utilized by
Northrop Grumman Newport News. In this thesis, all numeric information has been
20
Pipe Detail
modified to conceal proprietary data without skewing actual patterns to portray trends
within various processes.
21
22
3. Review of Key Concepts
3.1 Lean Principles
Lean theory was developed and implemented in the Toyota Motor Company in the
early 1970s. In an organization that follows lean principles all the employees are focused
on finding and removing all the sources of inefficiencies and waste in all the areas of the
organization. (Bozdogan, et al., 2000) Womack and Jones identified five principles of
lean:
" Specify value: identify the right product for the customer, provide the product at a
good price and in timely manner
* Identify Value Stream: determine actions needed to bring the specified product
through three business management activities: problem-solving, information
management, and transformation.
* Flow: continuous movement of process steps that bring value to the customer
* Pull: allowing the customer pull to the product as needed as opposed to pushing
unneeded product onto the customer
* Perfection: continuously improving business operations by enhancing value, value
stream, flow, and pull
Two strategic concepts in addition to Womack and Jones' five principles have been
identified by the MIT's Transition-To-Lean (TTL) Team to capture the nature of lean. The
two concepts are:
* Horizontal Organizational Focus
" Relationships Based on Mutual Trust and Commitment
In addition to the lean concepts and principles mentioned above, MIT's Lean Aerospace
Initiative (LAI) has developed five principles of Lean Enterprise Value (Murman, et al.,
2002):
* Create lean value by doing the job right and by doing the right job
" Deliver value only after identifying stakeholder value and constructing robust value
propositions
* Fully realize lean value only by adopting an enterprise perspective
" Address the interdependencies across enterprise levels to increase lean value
0 People, not just processes, effectuate lean value
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3.2 Value Stream Mapping
A value stream map is a tool-often created using a pencil and paper-that assists with
the understanding of the flow of material and information. The map tracks a product as it
moves from one process step to the next, from its origins at the suppliers to the final end
customers. (Rother and Shook, 1999) A product group, which consists of parts that
undergo similar processing on a common set of equipment, should be selected for the
creation of the value stream map. (Jones and Womack, 2002)
Rother and Shook (1999) summarized the benefits of value stream mapping.
- Assists with visualizing the flow across the entire process
* Assists with identifying sources of waste
* Provides universal language for talking about processes
Provides common view point for effective decision making
- Unites lean techniques and principles to ensure an efficient approach to problem
solving
- Provides a baseline to work from during lean implementation
- Shows interactions between information and material flow, which is unique to this
tool
Describes in quantitative and qualitative detail how the facility operates and how it
should operate to ensure flow.
3.3 Definition of Waste and Benefits of Waste Elimination
Identification and elimination of non-value added steps in all the processes of an
enterprise is the essence of the lean enterprise. Womack and Jones divided waste, or
muda, into seven categories
* Errors that require rework
* Production of unneeded goods
* Excessive processing steps
* Unnecessary people, material, and information movement
* Idle people, machinery, or material
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" Manufacturing products and rendering services which do not meet customer's
needs
* Excessive inventory
Benefits of waste elimination improve overall efficiency of an enterprise. The following
benefits are observed when waste is eliminated (Bozdogan, et al., 2000).
- Improvement in responsiveness to customers, decrease in quality defects reaching
customers, decreased cycle time
" Improvement in manufacturing floor organization and overall reduction of floor
space
" Labor productivity increase
" Simplification of production and information control systems
* Timely arrival of shipments from the supplier
* Reduction of warehouse space
* No finished goods inventory build up
* Reduction in inventory levels across the value stream
3.4 Application of Lean Principles in the Shipyard
The external customer of the shipyard is the US Navy. The internal customers are the
trades that perform the outfitting and fabrication of the ship, therefore all the information
and material flow should be scheduled to satisfy the ship need dates. Examination of the
value stream map shows that every process' customer is the process found downstream
from it, with information supporting all the manufacturing processes.
Lean implementation in the shipyard to this point has occurred in functional areas and
not across the enterprise as a whole. This can result in sub-optimization of various
processes. No personnel are responsible for tracking the progress of a system or an
assembly as it travels through all the process steps. Thus, it is difficult to identify and fix
obstacles to fabrication completion that stem from interdependencies across multiple
departments. The lean principles and enterprise value principles should be applied to all
the processes along the value stream to improve the enterprise efficiency and effectiveness.
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"In addition to creating and delivering value to end-use customers, there are many
stakeholders involved in an enterprise, including employees, suppliers, shareholders,
labor unions (if any), and society." (Nightingale, et al., 2003)
The needs of the downstream process, as an immediate customer, should be identified at
each step of the process keeping in mind the needs of the ship, as the internal customer,
and the US Navy as the external customer. Value stream identification across the entire
enterprise is necessary to identify all the value added steps. The enterprise level value
stream map described in this thesis is an effort to identify the value stream in the shipyard.
Continuous flow and pull are necessary for smooth operations of production in the
shipyard. The two concepts are difficult to implement considering the shipyard's job shop
environment and push mentality. All the processes across the value stream should always
be in a state of continuous improvement to achieve perfection. Horizontal organizational
focus should be maintained to ensure optimization of the entire value stream as opposed to
the sub-optimization of individual process steps. Relationships based on mutual trust and
commitment should be reinforced and the decision making power should be transferred to
the personnel on the production floor with engineering and planning providing support to
the personnel in the shops, platen, and dry dock.
The shipyard can benefit from the elimination of the wastes described in Section 3.3.
The US Navy often changes the specifications for different systems at the time when the
system is being worked by engineering and planning. Adoption of lean principles and
elimination of waste will allow the shipyard to be more flexible and respond to the US
Navy changes faster. Also, when errors, which need to be fixed upstream, are found
downstream, the response time will be shorter and less costly due to the robustness of the
enterprise as a whole.
The shipyard, unlike a high volume manufacturer, does not benefit from overall
process cycle time reductions. The delivery of the ship to the US Navy needs to take place
on the day when the US Navy requested the delivery of the ship. If the carrier is delivered
early, the US Navy will not accept the product and the ship will remain sitting in one of the
dry docks with large overhead dry dock costs. If the carrier is delivered late, the shipyard
loses part of its profit due to the untimely delivery and penalties. However, it is important
that the cycle times of the individual processes comprising the enterprise are shortened to
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absorb uncertainty. This will provide the enterprise with flexibility and predictability that
enables the shipyard to meet schedule commitments consistently.
The remaining benefits listed in Section 3.3 fully apply to the shipyard. Reduction of
inventory, improvement of manufacturing floor organization, reduction of warehouse
space, etc. would significantly boost the efficiency and effectiveness of the shipyard.
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4. Value Stream Mapping Literature Review
Many manufacturing companies, such as Boeing and American Axle, concentrate
efforts and devote resources to implementing lean in their factories. Different approaches
are used to create current state value stream maps. The theory, approaches, challenges
associated with each approach, and typical outcomes are examined and compared in this
section.
4.1 Value Stream Current-State Map Creation Process
Rother and Shook (1999) describe the current-state value stream map creation process
in their book, Learning to See: Value Stream Mapping to Add Value and Eliminate Muda.
The authors use a simple example to explain the nuances of the current-state map creation
process. The following are some of the important aspects to a successful value-stream map
creation:
" Always collect current-state information while walking along the actual pathways
of material and information flows yourself.
" Begin with a quick walk along the entire door-to-door value stream.
" Begin at the shipping end and work upstream.
" Bring your stopwatch and do not rely on standard times or information that you do
not personally obtain.
* Map the whole value stream yourself.
e Always draw by hand in pencil.
These tips are provided to make sure that the creator of the current-state map understands
the whole flow, obtains accurate information, and begins with the processes that are
closely linked to the customer. Utilization of these tips when creating the current-state
value stream map is discussed in Section 4.4.
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4.2 Boeing 717 Final Assembly Line
Victoria Gastelum (2002) used heuristic approach when creating a value stream map
for Boeing 717 final assembly line. The heuristic approach was used to bypass the
utilization of mathematical models due to the lack of all the required resources. Gastelum
assembled a team of industrial engineers from the Airframe, Systems, and Interiors areas,
which constituted the final assembly line. The engineers had a good understanding of the
key steps and requirements that needed to occur in their respective areas to complete the
construction of the plane in the efficient and timely manner. However, there was a lack of
understanding of the step sequence across the entire final assembly line.
The construction of the current state value stream map for the Boeing 717 final
assembly line occurred over the period of one and a half months. The first step of the final
assembly value stream map creation occurred with the engineers constructing a value
stream map of their area, and then linked the value streams from each area. The step
sequence was printed on a large paper scrolls and then posted on the wall. This assisted
the engineers with the understanding and visualization of the interrelations between all the
steps occurring in all three areas.
All the process steps across the final assembly line were divided into five families
based on the constraints, such as physical space or location, associated with each step. The
engineers provided the touch and cycle times for each step. The most challenging part of
the value stream map creation process was dealing with the changing sequencing nature of
the steps and/or constraints, such as design specifications or space constraints, across the
value stream.
Value stream mapping effort assisted the management and engineers with the
understanding of the main drivers of the flow time, planning of the next rate break, and
implementing consequent lean tactics and methods.
4.3 American Axle Tonawanda Forge Facility
Stephen King (2004) performed a value stream mapping exercise at American Axle
Tonawanda forge facility for a family of the ring gear and net shape gear product lines.
Management looked to understand the product value stream in the forge facility as well as
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to use the obtained information to optimize the extended value stream. King used a hybrid
approach to value stream mapping, which he defined as "a process of directly observing
the flows of information and materials as they occur in the entire manufacturing system,
summarizing them visually, and the envisioning a future state with improved
performance". The product family was chosen based on the commonalities of the
manufacturing processes.
The first steps of the King's value stream mapping process consisted of determining
the strategy of the organization for the product family and the scope of the mapping
exercise. The value stream map included all the processes starting with the raw steel
supplier and ending with the customer's assembly plant. King created value stream maps
for the gear product family processing facilities that were controlled by American Axle.
King utilized a database to extract the needed information for all the process steps
performed in the Tonawanda Forge Facility. Then, he interviewed the operators, first line
supervisors, and engineers to determine accuracy and applicability of the information
found. Through these informal interviews, King also determined the perceived problem
areas from the staff's vantage point. Finally, King interviewed senior staff such as plant,
material, and business planning managers to find out large scale issues applicable to the
entire facility.
The external value stream map creation process started with King sending out
questionnaires to determine key process and information flow parameters to the suppliers.
Once the questionnaires were completed, King visited every supplier's site to verify,
discuss, and find additional needed information. The customer value stream maps were
created in the same manner as the suppliers'.
The created Tonawanda value stream maps were connected to each other and to the
external companies' value stream maps to form an extended value stream map. The entire
current state value stream mapping process took approximately a month.
4.4 Comparison of the Value Stream Mapping Processes
The three value stream map creation processes at Boeing, American Axle, and
Northrop Grumman differ from each other and from the theoretical approach discussed in
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Section 4.1. The differences and similarities between the theoretical and actual value
stream map creation processes are discussed in this section.
The boundaries of the value stream maps created in each company varied significantly.
The value stream map created for the assembly line at Boeing had smaller boundaries than
the value stream map created for Northrop Grumman's shipyard. The value stream map
for the Northrop Grumman shipyard had smaller boundaries than the entire forge facility,
its supplier and customer sites at American Axle.
Northrop Grumman's enterprise value stream map was created through the interviews
of representatives from various departments along the value stream. Some of the numeric
information was extracted from the MRP system. The detailed description of the
enterprise value stream map created at Northrop Grumman Newport News is provided in
the next chapter.
Rother and Shook suggest collecting current-state information while walking along the
actual pathways of material and information flows and map the whole value stream
yourself. This is a challenging task in many companies, because information and material
flows are very extensive. However, it seems that the benefit from understanding the entire
value stream for the chosen product family is invaluable. One person was dedicated in
each company to create the entire value stream map. Each individual utilized the
knowledge and expertise of other personnel working in different areas along the value
stream to create the maps. Therefore, the persons responsible for the value stream maps in
each company understood the entire flow for the chosen product family.
Another tip discussed in Section 4.1 is to begin the value stream mapping process by a
quick walk along the entire value stream. Although the door-to-door walk provides a great
sense of the flow and sequence, it is not always feasible to walk along the entire value
stream. At Northrop Grumman, some difficulties were experienced when identifying
information part of the value stream. In order to understand the functions of different
departments involved with the information creation for the chosen product group,
extensive interviews had to be conducted with its' members. Therefore, it would not be
possible to determine which departments were part of the appropriate value stream through
a quick walk. When creating a value stream map for the American Axle's forge facility
32
and its customer and supplier sites, it would be difficult to conduct a quick walk due to the
extensive boundaries of the value stream.
Rother and Shook suggest starting the value stream map creating process at the
shipping end and then move upstream. At Boeing, the value stream map process
considered all three assembly areas simultaneously. At Northrop Grumman, the process
started at the fabrication shops, which are located in the middle of the value stream. At
American Axle, the value stream map creation process started at the forge facility and then
was extended to the customer and supplier sites. It appears that the value stream map
creation process in the companies is easier to start in the areas that are easily accessible,
which do not always correspond to the shipping end. For example, at Northrop Grumman
the shipping end is considered to be the dry dock where the aircraft carrier is assembled.
Starting value stream map creation process there would be very challenging due to the
complexity of the product and difficulty of the accessibility of the chosen product family.
Another tip provided by Rother and Shook is bringing a stopwatch and not relying on
standard times or information that is not personally obtained. In all three companies the
information was obtained either through interviews or through MRP systems, without the
use of the stopwatch. The value stream maps were so extensive that it would take a long
time to measure all the functions with a stopwatch. In a job shop environment, such as in
the Northrop Grumman's shipyard, it is not necessary to determine the times accurately,
since most jobs are rarely repeated. It is necessary, however, to determine the typical times
to understand where the majority of the waste is located along the value stream. Also, it is
difficult to use stopwatch to time some functions, such as engineering drawing design,
which takes weeks to complete. Of course, it is important to ensure that the information
drawn from sources such as a MRP system are reliable.
At times, those jobs that can be timed are not easy to time correctly. For example,
during an initiative at one of the companies, some jobs were timed with a stopwatch.
Later, it was found that the workers slowed down their pace to ensure that the time
measured would be larger than the typical time it takes to complete a job. This was done
to introduce some buffer time into the total job time. This buffer time is used to deal with
jobs that are more difficult than typical or if a problem with a typical job is encountered.
This way, if the job takes longer than the measured time, the workers do not get
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reprimanded. Also, if the jobs are completed faster than the measured time, the workers
benefit from the early job completion.
In the summary, some of the theoretical ideas regarding the value stream map creation
process are difficult to use when creating value stream maps in a company. Different
methods are used to create value stream maps in different companies and depending on the
boundaries of the process for which the value stream map is being created, the accessibility
of information, and the complexity of the process itself.
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5. Value Stream Mapping at Newport News Shipbuilding
"The way that ships, and most other manufactured artifacts, are actually produced is by
procuring or fabricating parts and joining them to create subassemblies. In turn, these
are combined through several manufacturing levels to produce increasingly larger
subassemblies. Thus, the ideal way to subdivide ship-construction work is to focus on
needed parts and subassemblies, i.e., the actual interim products that preoccupy
workers. A scheme to subdivide work in accordance with an interim-product view, is a
product-oriented work breakdown structure" (Okayama, 1982)
In this section, the process of enterprise level map creation for Assembly I am
described. High level and detailed enterprise value stream maps are shown in Exhibit 2
and Exhibit 3, respectively. List of all the icons used in the value stream maps is shown in
Exhibit 1. A walk through the copper, steel and assembly pipe shops was the starting point
of the creation process. Julie Wilhelmi (2001) started her value stream mapping effort in
the factory as well when creating a value stream map for Boeing 777's outboard stowbin.
The next steps involved meeting with and interviewing representatives from upstream
departments such as planning, engineering, and sourcing to determine their amount of
involvement with the Assembly I's design, development, and planning. Information
obtained from these departments is a rough estimate since no systems exist to capture the
baseline on the exact amount of time spent on the performing functions associated with
Assembly I. Most data captured for the material and information movement and
fabrication through the shops is extracted from SAP. All of the values have been changed
to prevent the disclosure of proprietary information with all the trends remaining true.
During the process of interviewing and data gathering, it became apparent that
perception on how in the process works differs between management and the practitioners
of the process. The process of implementing the improvements requires the alignment of
the understanding between all the parties involved.
5.1 Customer, Contracts and Pricing, Engineering, Sourcing, and Suppliers
Customer, Contracts and Pricing, Engineering, Sourcing, and Suppliers work closely
with one another to set up and price the contract, design the systems, and order the
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material. Times associated with each department's involvement in various functions are
roughly estimated due to the challenge of separating each department's level of
participation.
5.1.1 Customer and Contracts and Pricing
The entire process is initiated by the customer, the United States Navy, deciding to
purchase an aircraft carrier. The first step in the process is the U.S. Navy's submittal of the
Request for Proposal (RFP), which outlines and describes system requirements for the
aircraft carrier, to Northrop Grumman Newport News' Contracts and Pricing department.
The current carrier is the first aircraft carrier that the Navy submitted a Contract Plan for,
which roughly described specifications and requirements for the carrier, a few years prior
to the release of the RFP. The provision of the Contracts Plan greatly assisted Northrop
Grumman Newport News with timely review of the RFP.
Personnel from Contracts and Pricing involved numerous departments throughout the
shipyard such as engineering, manufacturing, sourcing, etc. to evaluate the requirements
described in the RFP. The design of numerous systems with some alterations was
transferred over from the previous aircraft carrier. Some of the systems, such as System I,
which Assembly I is part of, were unique to the current carrier. Once the RFP was
evaluated and priced, Contracts and Pricing submitted the Proposal to the Navy. The
Navy's personnel evaluated the Proposal, which initiated negotiations between the Navy
and Northrop Grumman Newport News' Contracts and Pricing department. When
negotiations were completed, the base contract between the U.S. Navy and Northrop
Grumman Newport News was signed.
System I was not part of the RFP and was proposed by the shipyard's engineering as an
Engineering Change Proposal (ECP). The ECP is a vehicle for evaluating and presenting
design changes to the customer in a standard manner. The ECP was evaluated, priced,
negotiated, and accepted prior to the signing of the Base Contract. System I ECP became
part of the Base Contract and the values, such as costs and time associated with its
development and negotiation, could not be extracted from the values associated with the
Base Contract. The enterprise level value stream map captures the time interval from the
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RFP submission to the Base Contract signing and not just System I ECP, which is
equivalent to eighty weeks. Value added time for the System I could not be determined
due to the complexity and size of the base contract.
5.1.2 Engineering
The engineering department is comprised of system and production engineers and
designers. System engineers are heavily involved with the proposal preparation and once
the contract is signed, they initiate the development of the aircraft carrier on the system
level. The conceptual design effort results in a two-dimensional system diagram for each
pipe system where major pieces of equipment, sizes, and flow directions are identified.
System diagrams are checked by other system engineers to ensure all the calculations and
design to specifications are correct. System engineers work with vendors to obtain vendor
equipment drawings based on the requirements captured in the system diagrams. Next,
system diagrams are released to the Navy for the approval and after the approval is
received, the engineering supervisor for the system approves and releases the system
diagram.
After all the necessary approvals are received, the System I diagram, along with vendor
equipment drawings, is released by system engineers to the modeler. The modeler inputs
and creates a three-dimensional drawing of each piece of equipment, fittings, and pipe into
a program used by designers, who create a preliminary three-dimensional arrangement
drawing to ensure the system fits into the designated space on the ship. To create a
producible design, designers work in conjunction with production engineers to break down
the system into assemblies, details and loose parts. Once the system break down at the
assembly level is complete, assemblies are further broken down into details and loose parts
and then details are broken down into parts. The two production engineers, who helped
with the selection of the Assembly I, were heavily involved with the system break down.
Production engineers use their shop fabrication and ship experience to ensure the system is
optimally designed to allow efficient fabrication on the shop floor. They group parts into
assemblies and details and provide a sequence sheet with the description of group
boundaries to designers who then create engineering bills of material (EBOM). System
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engineers check designers' and production engineers' arrangement drawings to make sure
no mistakes were made. After, system engineers submit the Planned Independent
Requirement (PIR) to sourcing to order material. Additional submitted items include
drawings, EBOM, and group list to planning which is described in Section 5.2.
The enterprise level value stream map shows system engineering lead time to be 18
weeks with value-added time of 2 week and designer and production engineering lead time
to be 18 weeks with value-added time of 12 weeks.
5.1.3 Sourcing and Suppliers
The sourcing department works with various suppliers to ensure the correct material
order is placed with the suppliers and the material is delivered on schedule to ensure timely
shop fabrication and ship construction completion. Sourcing department personnel,
buyers, are organized into sub-groups based on the type of commodity they are responsible
for. All the material necessary, pipe, fittings, and blowers, for the Assembly I was ordered
by three buyers. Assembly I roughly consists of 10 valves, 5 pieces of pipe, 10 fittings,
and 29 details. Each detail consists of 3-5 pieces of pipe and 5-10 fittings.
The material purchasing process is initiated when buyers receive the Planned
Independent Requirement (PIR), which contains the material description, quantity, and
specifications from system engineers for all material. Next, the buyers create a Request for
Quote (RFQ) using the information provided in the PIR and submit it to the appropriate
supplier. The supplier evaluates the RFQ and returns a quote with the dollar value and the
estimated delivery date. Prior to submitting a purchase order to the supplier, buyers make
certain that the quote contains all the correct information and check the adequacy of the
estimated delivery date. Once the purchase order is received, the supplier submits the
software report, which consists of all the associated paper work, such as engineering
reports and drawings, accompanying the material ordered, to the buyer. All the software
associated with new or unique material is submitted to the material engineers to ensure the
material satisfies the navy specifications and shipyard's requirements. Software approval
can be a lengthy, iterative process between the engineers, suppliers, and buyers. Once the
software is approved, the supplier starts material manufacturing. All the material required
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for Assembly I fabrication is ordered in parallel with the longest ordering process duration
of approximately 30 weeks with 2.3 week of value added time.
5.2 Planning and Warehousing
Engineering completion of the design and drawing breakdown triggers the planning
departments to initiate their five-tier planning process. The process includes creating
assembly groups, detail grouping and attaching material in the MRP system, and
developing a detailed schedule for all the shops to ensure timely assembly fabrication
completion, and initiating the material flow.
5.2.1 Advanced Planning, Grouping, and Production Planning
The first tier of the five tier planning process is advanced planning. During the
assembly's or detail's drawing break down process, production engineers place a request to
advanced planners to create a group number in a database for the assembly or detail. The
assembly's unique group number shows the aircraft carrier number that the assembly is
designated for, the cost class, and the assembly's location on the ship. Advanced planners
create the group number in the database and transmit the number to the production
engineers. Once production engineers complete their break downs and the designers
complete the drawings, they pass the assembly and its detailed drawings, EBOM, and the
group number to the advanced planners. The planners perform a quality check to ensure
the material included in the EBOM matches the material needed as shown on the drawings.
If a problem is found, advanced planning returns the information to engineering to resolve
the problem. According to advanced planning, they find problems with approximately
50% of the drawings. The time it takes to resolve the issue varies depending on the
complexity of the problem and the engineering work load. Once the information is
verified, the advance planners pass down the information to a person who transfers the
information from the database to SAP, which is used throughout the shipyard.
Grouping is the second tier of the five tier planning process. Grouping is responsible
for assigning material to the assembly and detail groups in SAP. Prior to starting the
material assignment, grouping makes sure that the correct quantities and part numbers are
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listed on the drawing. If a problem is found, grouping returns the information to the
advanced planning to resolve the problem. If advanced planning is not able to fix the
issue, they transfer the information back to engineering for problem resolution. It is not
possible to determine the percentage of the information that has to return to engineering or
the problem resolution timeline. According to grouping, they find problems with
approximately 10% of the information passed down from advanced planning. Once
verification is complete, grouping converts EBOM to planning bill of material (PBOM) by
assigning quantities and part numbers in SAP for all the parts needed to build an assembly
or detail. Grouping is responsible for the detail and assembly routing to the shops. For
example, they decide whether the steel or copper pipe shop needs to fabricate a particular
detail and route the detail group in SAP to be fabricated in the appropriate detail shop.
Once material is attached and groups are routed in SAP, grouping passes the information to
production control.
Production control is the third tier of the planning process. The main function of
production control is detail and assembly routing through the shops and production
package creation. The first step of production control is to check the quality of the
information passed down from grouping to ensure an exact match between the drawing and
the PBOM. If a problem is found, production control returns the information to grouping
for correction. If grouping is not able to resolve the issue, they pass the information back
to advanced planning. If advanced planning is not able to resolve the problem, the
information is returned to engineering. According to production control, they find
problems with approximately 50% of the information passed down from grouping. Once
information is verified, production control determines the shop operation steps and
sequence that parts need to undergo to be fabricated into a detail or assembly.
As an example, the following is the planning process that a detail, consisting of a bent
pipe and an elbow attached to one end of the pipe, undergoes. Production control routes
the pipe through the bending operation, where pipe is bent, then through the fabrication
operation, where the elbow is tack welded to the pipe, and finally the welding operation,
where the elbow is welded to the pipe, completing the detail. Production control uses a
target tool to specify target duration for each operation step referred to as the target time.
Next, production control performs a simulation in SAP, which takes into consideration the
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ship need date (SND) and target time, to determine each shops fabrication start and end
dates. Production control's last step is to create a planned package, which is a folder
containing detail or assembly drawings and the target time sheet. Once finished,
production control pushes all the completed planned packages to the MRP controller, the
fourth tier of the planning process. The functions of the last two planning steps are
described in section 5.2.2.
The enterprise level value stream map shows advanced planning, grouping, and
production planning lead times to be 8.4, 3.5, and 6.4 weeks with value-added times of 6,
20, and 16 hours, respectively, including rework.
5.2.2 Shop Planning and Warehousing
Shop planning and warehousing are highly interconnected processes. Shop planning
consists of a MRP controller, who provides information to all the detail and assembly
shops, and shop controllers, who are responsible for the material and information flow at
each shop. The MRP controller and shop controllers are respectively the fourth and fifth
tiers of the five tier planning process.
One part of the Assembly 1, a flange, was fabricated in the steel fabrication and
machine shops. Part of the process captured in the VSM that involves steel warehouse,
steel fabrication shop, and machine shop are not going to be looked at closely in this thesis,
since the majority of the Assembly I was fabricated in the pipe fabrication shops.
The MRP controller receives assembly and detail planned packages from the
production planners and converts the planned packages into the work packages by adding a
break down report. A production order (PO) number is created in SAP for each work
package. A detailed breakdown of all the fabrication steps is created for each work
package. The breakdown report provides all the detailed information needed for the
assembly or detail fabrication. It includes ticket numbers, which are bar codes used by
personnel on the shop floor to keep track of the actual time spent on a task. The bar codes
are further discussed in Section 5.3. The MRP controller checks to see if the material
needed for a detail and assembly fabrication is available in the warehouse. If material is
available, the work package is released to the shops and material is committed. Material
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commitment in SAP signifies the reservation of the material for the specific assembly or
detail. SAP prevents another reservation of the committed material to a different
assembly. However the inventory level in SAP is not reduced and still shows the
committed material availability. If an assembly or a detail that has a higher priority than
the assembly with the committed material needs the same material, the material is
recommitted. If material is unavailable, the MRP controller contacts the material
operations department, 'material chasers', to find the missing material. This process will
be further discussed in Section 5.3.
All the information is pushed down the value stream starting with engineering and
ending with the MRP control. Shop controllers pull the information provided to them by
the MRP controller. General shop material order and flow process is shown in Figure 5-1
and explained in the text that follows the Figure.
Figure 5-1: Shop Material Order and Flow Process
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Released assembly and detail work package POs are added to each shop's released job
queue list. A separate list of the available jobs is maintained for each pipe shop in a
database accessible to both MRP and shop controllers. Pulling the jobs into the shops
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provides flexibility for the shop controllers to efficiently level load the shops. Shop
controllers take into the account need date and material availability as well as the shop
floor and work force availability prior to requesting the information and material needed
for fabrication of a detail or an assembly. The shop controller provides new planned
fabrication start and finish dates, which often differ from the original planned fabrication
timeline, based on this information, but the fabrication date still should support the ship
need date. Once a shop controller requests the work package, the MRP controller enters
new planned fabrication dates into SAP and initiates material flow by sending a transfer
order (TO), which specifies material needed and its quantity, to the warehouses. At this
point, the material becomes reserved for the assembly or detail. Finally, MRP controller
prints out the breakdown report, adds it to the work package, and brings it to the shop. The
enterprise level value stream map shows the MRP controller and shop controller lead times
to be 4 days and 15.6 weeks, respectively, with value-added time of 4 hours each.
The TOs sent by the MRP controllers enter a warehouse TO queue upon receipt.
Assembly I consists of fittings and pipe, therefore TOs were sent to the fitting and pipe
warehouses. From experience, shop controllers are aware that the fitting delivery process
is not as reliable as the pipe delivery process. Fittings are not always available even if the
system shows that they are. Generally, pipe is a lot larger than the fittings, so the shop
does not have the space to store the pipe while waiting for fittings due to shop storage area
space constraints. Therefore, shop controllers order fittings first, wait for their arrival to
the shop, and then order the pipe. Once the pipe arrives, shop controllers release the
material and information to start fabrication.
The fitting warehouse operator obtains the material for the TOs on a first come first
serve basis with the exception of the priority requests. The operator pulls all the requested
fittings from various locations, kits them together in the warehouse, and sends them to the
shop. Once the shop receives the fittings designated for a specific assembly, the shop
controller places a request via email to the pipe warehouse operator with the request to fill
the pipe TO associated with the assembly. The pipe warehouse operator places the request
into the queue of other pipe requests that are filled on a first come first serve basis with the
exception of the priority requests. The pipe warehouse operator cuts various pipe to the
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requested lengths, kits the pipe sections in the pipe warehouse, and sends them to the
designated shop for fabrication.
Shop material control personnel kits together the pipe, valves, and the fittings,
designated for a specific detail or assembly, in the shop staging area and informs the shop
controller of the material availability for fabrication. Once the space and personnel
becomes available for the fabrication start, the shop controller requests material control to
release and deliver the material to the designated space on the shop floor. The enterprise
level value stream map shows warehouse operators and material controllers lead times to
be 4 weeks and 2 days with value-added time of 2 days and 4 hours, respectively.
5.3 Fabrication Shops
Operations of the steel, copper, and assembly pipe shops are examined in this section.
Steel and copper pipe shops fabricate details consisting of fittings and pipe, while
assembly pipe shop fabricates assemblies consisting of pipe, fittings, valves and details. In
most cases assemblies are considerably larger than details therefore it takes a longer period
of time to fabricate assemblies than details.
5.3.1 Steel and Copper Pipe Shops
Steel and copper pipe shops perform similar functions however the two shops are
segregated due to the differences in the characteristics of the two metals. The difference in
softness of the two metals, with copper being softer than steel, requires the use of special
handling techniques for each metal. The copper pipe shop is smaller than the steel pipe
shop due to the lesser number of copper details required for the carrier construction.
Detail fabrication in the copper and steel pipe shops usually starts when all the material
becomes available. If some material is unavailable, the two shops have a material
operations representative whose sole purpose is to find the missing material and ensure its
speedy delivery to the shop. Material operators work closely with MRP controller and
shop controllers to identify which material is missing. Once identified, material operators
work closely with warehouses and sourcing to identify the reason for the material delay
and resolve the immediate problem. Once all the material arrives to the shop, detail
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fabrication starts. The shops perform a number of different operations such as bending,
cleaning, fabrication, welding, and joint x-raying. The two shops fabricate details
consisting of pipe and fittings or just pipe. Details with associated work packages move
from one operation to the next as specified by production control.
Actual time spent on each job is tracked by the bar code system through bar codes,
otherwise known as ticket numbers, associated with each operation step that are included
in the breakdown report of a work package. For example, a welder scans in the bar code at
the beginning of the welding operation step, which starts the count of the actual time spent
on welding. When the welder completes the job, the material is moved to the next
operation step specified in the work package. Once finished with the first job, the welder
moves to the next job and scans in the bar code of the next work package. This stops the
time count for the first job and starts the time count for the second job. Total time spent on
the welding operation for the first job is now captured by the system. The bar code system
is used in the copper and steel pipe shops to determine the touch time for each operation
step and total time spent on a job also referred to as an actual fabrication duration. This
information is used to determine the correct dollar amount to charge the customer for the
work performed.
Summary of the details shop planning process is shown in Table 5.2.1.
Table 5.2.1 Copper and Steel Pipe Shops Planning Process
Step I Step 2 Step 3 (FinalSchedule)
Department Production Control Shop Control MRP Control
Method/System SAP Simulation Email Communication SAP Production
to MRP Control Data
-Ship Need Date -Material and
-Target Tool Avai i Shop Control
Inputs Estimated -ShopFloor Email
Fabrication ACailii . ommunication
DurationAvailabilityDuration 
-Personnel Availability
Figures 5-2 and 5-3 show the differences between the planned fabrication duration
provided by the shop controller and the actual fabrication duration for copper and steel
pipe shops, respectively. Sample size of 112 details, fabricated in each shop, is examined.
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Figure 5-2: Copper Pipe Shop Fabrication Duration Variance (Final Schedule)
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The histogram shows that the planned fabrication duration is overestimated on average 16
days with standard deviation of 7 days for 70 % of the details, correctly estimated for 16%
of the details, and underestimated on average of 27 days with a standard deviation of 25
days for the remaining 14% of the details.
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Figure 5-3: Steel Pipe Shop Fabrication Duration Variance (Final Schedule)
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The histogram shows that the planned fabrication duration is overestimated on average 20
days with standard deviation of 9 days for 82% of the details, correctly estimated for 9% of
the details within 3 days, and underestimated on average of 24 days with standard
deviation of 17 days for the remaining 9% of the details.
It is not possible to determine how many details are fabricated in a timely manner to
allow the assembly shop to start assembly fabrication on time with respect to the ship need
date. No schedule exists, with the exception of the original simulated one, to specify
assembly shop need date for the copper and steel pipe shops. Since the original schedule is
overridden once the MRP controller changes the dates based on the shop controller's
estimation of the new fabrication durations, it is not possible to determine if the detail is
fabricated in timely manner.
Although a large number of details is fabricated early in comparison to the planned
fabrication completion date, these details still do not meet the assembly shop's need dates.
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Detail shop controllers work to completing the detail fabrication within the allowed month
once the information becomes available. Detail shop controllers are allowed this flexibility
to ensure efficient shop work loading. If the material arrives to the shop as expected, most
details are fabricated in a couple of weeks. The controllers have no confidence that the
material requested is actually available and will be delivered to the shop within the typical
delivery timeline. Thus, detail shop controllers use the maximum allowed duration of five
weeks for the detail fabrication timeline when providing the fabrication duration to the
MRP controllers. Figures 5-2 and 5-3 show that the detail fabrication duration is
overestimated for a lot of the details.
Since the goal of the detail shops is to complete the detail fabrication within five weeks
and not to meet the assembly need date, number of details, which varies greatly depending
on the assembly, delay assembly's fabrication completion. Overestimated detail
fabrication duration introduces great variability into the assembly shop's planning and
fabrication process. Since the assembly shop controller does not have an estimate of the
detail fabrication completion date, he/she has difficulties planning an assembly fabrication.
Recommendations to improve the process are suggested in Section 8.1.
5.3.2 Assembly Pipe Shop
Assembly pipe shop operates differently from the copper and steel pipe shops.
Generally, assembly shop starts fabrication when approximately 70% of material becomes
available. The reason behind the premature fabrication start is that the shop cannot delay
the start of the assembly fabrication until all the material is available to ensure timely job
completion according to the schedule. The shop controller anticipates that the unavailable
material becomes available during the process of the assembly fabrication before the
planned finish date will be missed. The material operation representative dedicated to the
assembly shop performs the same functions in this shop as the one in the steel and copper
pipe shops. As the delinquent material becomes available it gets incorporated into the
assembly.
An assembly is assigned to a specific assembly shop floor space and its fabrication
occurs at that designated space from start to finish. The assembly shop uses
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photogrammetry, which is a digitizing process that estimates the relationship between
points to develop a plan for fixture positioning on the shop floor. Photogrammetry allows
the assembly shop to fabricate the assembly off the ship in the assigned assembly space
with a precise mockup of the ship's space.
Typically, one or two pipe fitters work on one assembly with a welder assisting them
as needed. Actual time spent on each operation is tracked using the bar code system in the
same manner as in the copper and steel pipe shops.
Original estimate of the assembly fabrication duration changes throughout the planning
process. The original fabrication duration is estimated during the creation of the ship
construction schedule. This duration is estimated based on the assembly design
specifications and the available assembly drawings. Figure 5-4 shows the differences
between the original planned fabrication duration estimated during the initial schedule
development with respect to the ship need date and the actual assembly fabrication
duration.
Figure 5-4: Assembly Fabrication Duration Variance (Original Schedule)
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The histogram shows that the planned fabrication duration is overestimated on average 30
days with standard deviation of 10 days for 80 % of the assemblies and underestimated on
average of 53 days with standard deviation of 40 days for the remaining 20% of the
assemblies.
The initial creation of the schedule for the shop fabrication duration is generated
through simulation by production controllers in SAP. Target tool, which assigns target
time for each operation, and the ship need date are used in the simulation to create the
planned fabrication duration. When the shop controller requests a work package, new
dates for the fabrication are created, which override the dates created through simulation.
The new planned fabrication duration takes into consideration material, shop space, and
personnel availability, photogrammetry report, and the ship need date. The final assembly
fabrication duration is developed in the same manner as the detail fabrication durations
summarized in Table 5.2.1. Figure 5-5 shows the differences between the planned
assembly fabrication duration provided by the shop controller and the actual assembly
fabrication duration.
Figure 5-5: Assembly Fabrication Duration Variance (Final Schedule)
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The histogram shows that the planned fabrication duration is overestimated on average 29
days with standard deviation of 11 days for 83 % of the assemblies and underestimated on
average of 50 days with standard deviation of 34 days for the remaining 17% of the
assemblies. Figures 5-4 and 5-5 show that assembly planned durations are overestimated
similarly to the detail shops as captured in Figures 5-2 and 5-3. Assembly shop controllers
overestimate fabrication durations due to the unreliability of timely material arrival to the
assembly shop. Majority of the problems come from late details and other material. The
problems that result in the assembly fabrication delay are discussed in Section 7.
5.4 Construction
Ship construction occurs on the platen, where Base A and superlifts are built and
staged, and in the dry dock, where superlifts are joined together to complete the structure
of the aircraft carrier.
On the platen, the Base As are outfitted with electrical and piping system parts and are
blasted and painted. Once the platen outfitting is complete, the Base As are joined together
to form a superlift. A lot of piping is put in place in the Base A and safeguarded for lifting,
but not permanently installed to ensure efficient joining to the systems in the Base A or
superlift adjacent to it. A number of pipe systems are hydro and pressure tested on the
platen. When all the planned outfitting is completed Base As are fitted and welded
together to form a superlift. The superlift is lifted and placed into the dry dock for further
outfitting and is joined to its adjacent superlifts. In order to optimize the use of the 900 ton
crane and to ensure efficient construction, superlifts that weigh close to the crane capacity
are lifted into the dry dock. System testing continues in the dry dock to ensure proper
functionality. Once the ship is completed and prior to its acceptance, the US Navy takes it
out for the sea trials for testing to ensure the functionality of all the systems.
Majority of the information presented in this chapter is associated with the Assembly I.
In Chapter 6, other pipe assemblies' information and material flows are examined to prove
that the Assembly I is representative of other assemblies fabricated in the shipyard. In
Chapter 7, a large set of the assemblies is analyzed to determine the root causes of the
problems preventing the timely assembly fabrication completion.
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6. Assembly and Detail Representation Verification
At the beginning of the project, an assumption was made that the pipe assembly
chosen to be used as the basis for the value stream map is representative of other pipe
assemblies. Therefore, challenges experienced with manufacturing and flow of the
Assembly I are assumed apply to most pipe assemblies fabricated in the shipyard. Copper,
steel, and assembly pipe shops are chosen as the setting for the analysis because the shops
represent the node where information and material flows unite. In this section, assembly
and detail representation assumptions are verified.
6.1 Assembly Pipe Shop
Fabrication in the assembly shop usually starts when approximately 70% of the
material becomes available as mentioned in Section 5.3. As the delinquent material
becomes available it gets incorporated into the assembly.
Sixteen assemblies were randomly selected from the list of approximately 50
assemblies that were completed during the same month. All the assemblies are composed
of a different number and type of pipe and fittings. Some of the assemblies were
completed on time while others were late with respect to ship need date. Information
associated with assemblies is always available prior to the start of assembly fabrication.
Durations for material flow prior to and during fabrication up to fabrication completion are
analyzed to portray chosen assembly's representation in Figure 6-1.
Material flow and fabrication duration is broken down into three intervals:
1. First material arrival date to fabrication start date.
2. Fabrication start date to last material arrival date.
3. Last material arrival date to fabrication finish date.
Assembly I's timeline is shown as assembly #17.at the top of the graph in Figure 6-1.
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Figure 6-1: Assembly I Representation Verification
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The largest time gap of approximately 150 days represents the time from the
fabrication start to the last material arrival date for assembly # 17 (Assembly I). Actual
fabrication of the Assembly I was occurring 50 out of the 150 days (35%), while during the
remaining 100 days the assembly was sitting idle on the assembly shop floor waiting for
delinquent material. The material designated for assembly #17 fabrication was sitting idle
on the assembly shop's floor longer than value added assembly fabrication time.
Examining the problematic material flow trend for the remaining 16 assemblies, 12
assemblies exhibit the same trend as the representative Assembly I. This shows that
Assembly I is, in fact, representative of most pipe assemblies fabricated in the shipyard.
6.2 Copper Pipe Shop
Fabrication in the copper pipe shop usually starts when all the material becomes
available. Material flow in the copper pipe shop occurs differently than in the assembly
pipe shop as described in Section 5.3.1. The copper shop controller always orders fittings
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first, and once fittings arrive, the controller orders the pipe. Fabrication starts upon pipe
arrival to the shop.
Sixteen details were randomly selected from the list of approximately 40 details that
were completed during the same week. All the details are composed of a different number
and type of pipe and fittings. Some of the details were completed on time, while others
were late. Information associated with details is always available prior to the time of the
first material arrival in the shop. Durations for material flow prior to fabrication and up to
fabrication completion are analyzed to portray a chosen details' representation in Figure 6-
2.
Material flow and fabrication duration is broken down into three intervals:
1. First material arrival date (fittings) to last material arrival date (pipe).
2. Last material arrival date to fabrication start date.
3. Fabrication start date to fabrication finish date.
Assembly I two details' timeline is shown as details #17 and #18 at the top of the
graph in Figure 6-2.
Figure 6-2: Assembly I Copper Details Representation Verification
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The largest time gap of approximately 23 days represents the time from the first
material arrival date to the last material arrival date for detail #17. The material designated
for detail #17 fabrication was idle in the copper shop's storage area longer than the detail's
fabrication duration. Twelve out of the sixteen chosen details show similar problematic
material flow trend.
The time gap of approximately 17 days represents the time from fabrication start to
fabrication finish for detail #18. All the material designated for detail 17 fabrication
arrived at the same time. The remaining 4 details out of the chosen 16 follow similar
unproblematic material flow trend. Therefore, majority of the time was spent on the detail
fabrication on the copper shop floor. This shows that Assembly I details are, in fact,
representative of most copper pipe details fabricated in the shipyard.
6.3 Steel Pipe Shop
Information flow, material flow, and fabrication in the steel pipe shop occur the same
way as in the copper pipe shop. Fittings and pipe are requested in the same manner due to
the same shop material storage constraints.
Eighteen details were randomly selected from the list of approximately 50 details that
were completed during the same day. All the details are composed of a different number
and type of pipe and fittings. Some of the details were completed on time, while others
were late. Information associated with the details is always available prior to the time of
the first material arrival in the shop. Durations for material flow prior to fabrication and up
to fabrication completion are analyzed to portray a chosen details' representation in Figure
6-3. Material flow and fabrication duration is broken down into the same three intervals as
in copper pipe shop. Assembly I two details' timeline is shown as details #19 and #20 at
the top of the graph in Figure 6-3.
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Figure 6-3: Assembly I Steel Details Representation Verification
Steel Shop Fabrication Timeline
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The largest time gap of approximately 33 days represents the time from the first
material arrival date to the last material arrival date for detail #20. Additional time gap of
roughly 10 days that represents the time from the last material arrival to fabrication start is
present for detail #20. Material flow and fabrication timeline for detail #19 are similar to
those of detail #20. The material designated for details #20 and #19 fabrication was idle in
the steel shop's staging area for an equivalent or longer period than the detail's fabrication
duration. Sixteen out of the chosen 18 details have similar problematic material flow trend
as the details #19 and #20, which were fabricated for Assembly I. This shows that
Assembly I details are, in fact, representative of most steel pipe details fabricated in the
shipyard.
Events and actions causing time gaps in the detail and assembly fabrication timeline
for all the shops will be discussed and analyzed further in Section 7.
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7. Data Analysis and Problem Origin Identification
In this section a general analysis approach, its results, and the detailed analysis of each
problem origin are discussed. All the dates and durations have been altered for liability
reasons, however the general trends hold.
7.1 General Analysis Approach and Results
The basis of the analysis is the assumption that the ship need date is critical for the
timely and successful completion of the aircraft carrier construction. Deckover is a
structural completion of a Base A, superlift, or compartment, which completes structural
boundaries to the internal space and/or limits the ability to load and outfit the unit.
Deckover drives the outfitting schedule and determines the ship need date, which
establishes and drives the shops' fabrication completion schedules. A number of negative
outcomes emerge if an assembly's fabrication completion does not meet the ship need date.
One outcome is that late assembly delays the deckover of a Base A or a superlift unit and
thus delays the construction completion of the ship.
Another outcome is that the deckover actually occurs prior to the assembly's
availability. In this case, additional costly work happens, consisting of cutting out part of
the deck for assembly installation and replacing the 'cutout' of the deck. The work that is
normally done on the platen occurs in the dry dock in an inflexible environment where it
becomes very difficult to install the assembly. This is a very costly procedure due to the
overhead, dry dock renting costs, and interference with other trades. Assemblies need to
be delivered to the platen in a timely manner in order to construct the ship according to the
schedule. Therefore, it is assumed that ship need date is critical for timely construction
completion of the aircraft carrier.
In order to obtain a representative sample of the pipe assemblies for the analysis,
binomial sampling is used. The sampling distribution of the pipe assemblies is well
described by the binomial distribution in this case, because the total number of assemblies
fabricated for the entire aircraft carrier is significantly larger than the sample size.
The binomial sampling formula uses the confidence bound of the sampling error to
determine how big a sample is required.
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L=z*sqrt(p*(1 -p)/n)
where
n: sample size
z: confidence level indicator, which means there is a 90% confidence that the mean
for a similar data population will not vary by more than the z value (1.65) for the
difference between the fabrication completion date and the ship need date. Z value
is extracted from the Statistical Table of Standard Normal Distribution and is
equivalent to the 90% confidence interval.
p: probability of late assembly delivery in respect to the ship need date
L: sampling error, refers to the difference between the results found based on the
analysis of the chosen assemblies and all the assemblies fabricated in the shipyard.
All the processing steps across the value stream have permissible durations for
completion of the function. For example, planning has 7 weeks to complete the
work packages, warehouses have 3 weeks to deliver the material to the shops, and
the detail shops have 5 weeks to complete the fabrication. Taking the smallest
allowed duration of 3 weeks and including the chosen 6% sampling error changes
the precision by 7 hours. This is insignificant in respect to the actual duration since
the error introduced is less than I workday.
Solving for n in terms of other variables gives n=z2*p*(1 -p)/L 2
The chosen sampling error of 6% and the confidence interval of 90% were the smallest
possible to determine a workable and reasonable sample size to allow the completion of the
analysis within the duration of the internship. For example, if the confidence interval of
95% was chosen, the sample size increases to approximately 265 assemblies. The analysis
of 265 assemblies would not be feasible to complete the project and produce results that
are indicative of other samples within the population.
Probability of late assembly delivery in respect to the ship need date is determined by
examining a sample of assemblies that are fabricated in the duration of one month.
Approximately 26 out of 50 assemblies fabricated during the chosen month were delivered
late to the ship. Therefore, the probability of late assembly delivery is 51%. So:
n=1.652*0.51*(1-0.51)/(0.06)2 =189
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The data for the delivery time line with respect to the ship need date for 189 assemblies
is shown in Figure 7-1.
Figure 7-1: Performance to Schedule
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A sample of 189 assembles is analyzed to determine the fabrication completion date in
respect to the ship need date. All of the assemblies have been divided into three
categories: early, on time, and late assembly fabrication completion.
Early assembly fabrication completion: assemblies completed at least 4 days prior to
ship need date.
On time assembly fabrication completion: assemblies completed between 4 days before
and after ship need date.
Late assembly fabrication completion: assemblies completed at least four days after
ship need date.
Table 7.1.1 summarizes the results of the analysis.
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Table 7.1.1 Fabrication Completion Timeline in respect to Ship Need Date Summary
Early Assembly On Time Late Assembly
Fabrication Assembly FabricationFabrication
Completion Completion Completion
Number of 95 16 78
Assemblies
Percent of 50 9 41
Assemblies
Average (days) 44 2 76
Standard 35 1 98
Deviation (days)
Fifty percent of the assemblies were delivered early in respect to the ship need date.
Assembly shop has a target of fabricating a specific number of assemblies on annual basis.
Also, the shop needs to make certain that enough fabrication work is available to ensure all
the personnel in the shop are fully utilized. This creates a situation where assemblies are
substituted. Forty one percent of the assemblies with an approaching ship need date had
issues that did not allow the shop to start fabrication. These assemblies were substituted
with unproblematic assemblies with the ship need dates that were scheduled further out in
the future. Thus, the substitute assemblies' fabrications were completed early. A large
amount of assemblies is fabricated early due to the combination of the annual assembly
fabrication quantity target and maximization of the personnel utilization goals.
The next step of the analysis focuses on determining the reasons for the assembly
fabrication completion delays. A total of 78 late assemblies' information and material
flow is closely examined. In this thesis, only the first problems that delayed the assemblies
were looked at due to the time constraint of the internship. Additional issues compounded
the delay of the assembly fabrication duration. The root causes for the delay are divided
into 8 categories and shown in Figure 7-2.
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Figure 7-2: Reasons for Late Assembly Fabrication Completion
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The process and logic used to identify causes for assembly delays is described in detail in
Sections 7.2-7.6.
7.2 Warehouse Stock Levels
Pipe and fitting warehouses keep a variety of material in stock designated for new
aircraft carrier construction and overhaul, and submarine construction and overhaul.
Twenty two assemblies, which represent 28% of all late assemblies in Figure 7-1, were late
due to the warehouse stock levels dropping to zero. Fifty percent of 22 assemblies were
late due to the fitting warehouse stockout with the remaining fifty percent late due to the
pipe warehouse stockout.
Eleven out of 22 assemblies were late because the fitting warehouse ran out of the
needed fitting. The analysis for the fitting warehouse stockout is shown in Table 7.2.1
using the data associated with one of the eleven late assemblies.
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Table 7.2.1 Fitting Warehouse Stock Depletion
Shipyard Work Shop AssemblyPackage Assembly Delivery
Fitting Release! Fitting Fabrication Date
Receipt Receipt Completion
Date Material Dae Start Date DtDate Date DateRequested
Planned -- 4/28/XX 5/19/XX 5/19/XX 6/30/XX 7/7/XX*
Actual 7/18/XX 7/23/XX 7/25/XX 8/4/XX 8/14/XX 8/16/XX
* Planned delivery date is the ship need date
In the example above, a gasket is the fitting that is usually stocked in the warehouse,
but was not available at the time it was needed. Inventory stock level is not used in
identifying stock amounts or the date of warehouse's material receipt, because the record
does not always reflect historic information. This issue will be covered in Section 7.7.
Normally, the assembly shop controller pulls material when enough material is
available to start fabrication. The controller checks if the available material is sufficient to
start fabrication. For example, an assembly consists of three fittings. The design specifies
that fitting one has to be joined to fitting two and fitting two needs to be joined to fitting
three. If fittings one and three are available and fitting two is not, the assembly shop
controller does not have sufficient material to start fabrication. If fittings one and two are
available but fitting three is not, the shop controller can pull the two available fittings and
have the shop work on joining fittings one and two while waiting for the arrival of fitting
three.
Material flow for a particular assembly can be examined by tracking Transfer Orders in
SAP. Examination of the fittings and details availability for the particular assembly
showed that all the material needed to start fabrication was available with the exception of
the gasket. SAP also shows that the material availability was checked numerous times, but
the work package was not requested or released due to the lack of some material.
Although some fittings and details were available, assembly fabrication was not initiated,
which implies that a critical piece was missing. As soon as the gasket appeared in the
warehouse, the shop controller requested the work package and release of all the remaining
material. Therefore, the lack of the gasket in the warehouse caused the assembly
fabrication completion date to slip. The same occurrence is observed with the remaining
10 assemblies and/or details, which were late due to the unavailability of the stocked parts.
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Eleven out of 22 assemblies were late because the pipe warehouse ran out of the
needed pipe. The analysis for the pipe warehouse stockout is shown in Table 7.2.2 using
the data associated with one of the eleven late assemblies.
Table 7.2.2 Pipe Warehouse Stock Depletion
Detail Detail
Shop Pipe Shop Detail Assembly Assembly DeliveryRequPie Pipe Fabrication Fabrication Fabrication De
Request Receipt End Date Start Date End Date Date
Date Date
Planned 3/21/XX 3/28/XX 4/25/XX 4/28/XX 6/2/XX 6/9/XX*
Actual 3/21/XX 6/12/XX 6/12/XX 7/21/XX 8/7/XX 8/9/XX
* Planned delivery date is the ship need date
Pipe warehouse stock levels depletion appear mostly when an assembly is late due to a late
detail. In the example above, the detail appeared to be the root cause of the assembly
fabrication start holdup since the remaining material needed was available. Investigation
of the reasons for the detail's delay showed that pipe, designated for the detail, was the last
material to arrive. The pipe order was placed on 3/21/XX and the pipe was received on
6/12/XX, almost three months later. Since the detail shop received the pipe after the ship
need date, the assembly shop was not able to meet the ship need date. The pipe warehouse
operator has a record of the request from the detail shop controller and the reason the
operator was not able to fill the order is due to the lack of the material. Therefore, the
detail was late due to the pipe warehouse stock out and the assembly was late in respect to
the ship need date due to the detail delay. The same occurrence is observed with the
remaining 10 assemblies' details, which were late due to the unavailability of the stocked
pipe.
7.3 Engineering Drawing Revisions
Changes to the engineering drawings occur through two different routes: revisions and
Inspection Reports (IR). Twelve assemblies, which represent 15% of all late assemblies in
Figure 7-1, were late due to the engineering drawing revisions. An example of a case,
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where the engineering drawing is revised after the drawing's release, is shown in Table
7.3.1 and described in this section.
Table 7.3.1 Engineering Drawing Revision Effect
DrawingDraing Drawing Rev. AssmbleF blyato
Rev. A Assembl Assembly DeliveryB Supervisor FabricationSupervisor Fabrication Date
Complete Complete Completion
Dlte Date Start Date Date
Date
Planned 8/23/XX -- 3/7/XX+1 5/16/XX+1 5/23/XX+1 *
Actual 8/23/XX 1/10/XX+1 5/20/XX+1 5/29/XX+1 6/2/XX+1
*Planned delivery date is the ship need date
Allowed normal durations for various process steps between drawing release and assembly
fabrication start:
All Planning excluding Shop Control 7 weeks
Material Delivery (Warehouse to Copper/Steel Shop) 3 weeks
Detail Shop Fabrication Duration 5 weeks
Material Delivery (Copper/Steel Shop to Assembly Shop) 3 weeks
Total: 18 weeks
Considering the drawing release date of 1/10/XX+l plus 18 weeks (126 days) allowed for
planning, material delivery, and detail fabrication, the assembly shop is theoretically able
to start assembly fabrication on 5/16/XX+1. The assembly shop theoretically needs 70
days to complete fabrication, which means the theoretical assembly fabrication is
completed on 7/25/XX+1, which is approximately a month after the ship need date. The
actual assembly fabrication start and end dates are listed in Table 7.3.1. Assembly was
delivered to the ship one week late. Therefore, late release of the engineering drawing
caused the delay in assembly fabrication completion and delivery to the ship. Twelve
assemblies were affected by engineering drawing revisions, which caused these assemblies
to be late with respect to ship need dates.
An IR is filed when a problem is discovered with a drawing, material, procedure, etc.
all along the value stream. Filing an IR ensures a speedy resolution of the problem,
because the nature of an IR is to bring importance to an issue.
A majority of the IRs filed in regards to the engineering drawings required part number
changes from one number to another. The resultant is that the drawing has to be changed,
however it is not going to change until the next planned revision and the planning process
will proceed with the change marked on the original revision of the drawing. Material part
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number changes resulted in rework of the information starting with planning and
continuing down the value stream. In most cases, a problem is found in engineering and
fabrication shops and affects the stocked parts. Twenty eight IRs were filed against the
seventy eight assemblies that were completed late. Fifteen and thirteen IRs were initiated
by engineering and the shops, respectively. Although none of the IRs effectuated the
initial delay, all the IRs caused the additional setback for the assembly fabrication
completion.
7.4 Detail Shop Loading Variability
Shop controllers guide the flow of material and information through the steel and
copper pipe shops. Seventeen assemblies, which represent 22% of all late assemblies in
Figure 7-1, were completed late due to the approach the detail shop controllers use for shop
loading. Thirty five percent of the seventeen assemblies were late due to the time gap
between the fitting and pipe order placement. Here, the shop controller received the
fittings, but waited for a while before ordering the pipe. Another thirty five percent of the
seventeen assemblies were late due to the late material pull. In this case, the material for
the detail fabrication was available in the warehouse, but the shop controller waited prior
to placing an order to transfer the material to the detail shop. The last thirty percent of the
seventeen assemblies were late due to the bending operation batching effect. Here, the
shop controllers batch the orders for different assemblies with the similar size pipe that
needs to be bent.
Six assemblies were late due to the time gap between the fitting and pipe order
placement. The analysis is shown below using the data associated with one of the six late
assemblies summarized in Table 7.4.1.
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Table 7.4.1 Time Gap between Fitting and Pipe Order Placement
Detail Detail Detail Detail
Shop Shop Shop Shop Assembly Delivery
Fitting Pipe Pipe Fabrication Fabrication Date
Receipt Order Receipt Start Date Start Date
Date Date
Planned 6/10/XX 6/10/ XX 6/20/ XX 6/20/ XX 6/23/ XX 8/11/ XX *
Actual 6/10/ XX 7/3/ XX 7/18/ XX 7/25/ XX 8/22/ XX 9/15/ XX
* Planned delivery date is the ship need date
This example examines the issue of the time gap between the fitting receipt date and pipe
order date. The detail described above consists of a fitting and a pipe. If the pipe order
was placed the same day as the fitting was received then the pipe would have arrived at the
shop on 6/20/ XX, considering pipe delivery duration to be approximately 10 days.
Assembly shop detail need date was 6/23/ XX, taking into account the ship need date and
the planned assembly fabrication duration. The detail would have been completed on time
for the assembly shop need date, considering the 2 day detail planned fabrication duration.
However, the shop controller waited for 23 days prior to ordering the pipe and starting
detail fabrication. Pipe warehouse was not experiencing a stock out at that time.
Therefore, the time gap between the fitting receipt and the pipe order placement caused the
detail to be late, which resulted in the assembly fabrication completion delay. Five other
assemblies were fabricated past the ship need date due to the issue of the fitting and pipe
ordering process.
Six assemblies were late due to the late material pull. The analysis is shown below
using the data associated with one of the six late assemblies summarized in Table 7.4.2.
Table 7.4.2 Late Material Pull
Material Material Detail Detail Assembly Delivery
Availa- Pull Fabrication Fabrication Fabrication Date
bility Date Date Start Date End Date Start Date
8/18/
Planned 2/6/ XX 5/1/ XX 5/15/ XX 6/16/ XX 6/20/ XX XX18
6/19/ 9/30/Actual 2/6/ XX XX 7/7/ XX 7/9/ XX 9/5/ XX XX
* Planned delivery date is the ship need date
The example above shows that the detail fabrication completion was late due to the late
material pull date. All the material was available 133 days prior to the time it was pulled
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by the shop controller. The actual pull date occurs one day prior to the scheduled assembly
shop fabrication start date. Detail fabrication starts on 7/7/ XX, which is 17 days later than
the assembly need date. This did not leave a sufficient amount of time for the assembly
shop to complete the assembly fabrication in a timely manner. Five other assemblies were
completed late due to the issue of late detail material pull.
Five assemblies were late due to bending operation batching effect. The analysis is
shown below using the data associated with one of the five late assemblies summarized in
Table 7.4.3.
Table 7.4.3 Bending Operation Batching Effect
Pipe Pipe Detail Detail Assemb
Order Receipt Fabrication Finsly Delivery
Placement Date Fabrication Finish Fabrication Date
Date Start Date Date Start Date
Planned 51/ XX 5/11/ 5/12/ XX 5/26/ XX 5/30/ XX 8/*Plane 5//X I8/11/
Actual 8/11/ XX 8/13/ 8/15/ XX 9/10/ XX 9/11/ XX 9/29/
* Planned delivery date is the ship need date
The detail shown above consists of one piece of pipe that needed only to be bent. Pipe
warehouse did not experience pipe stock out. The material was pulled late due to the
shop's bending machine batching practices. Shop controller waited to pull the material
until number of details, which contained similarly sized pipe that could be bent in batches,
became available. Planned fabrication duration for this detail was estimated at 10 days
however the actual fabrication duration was 29 days. Detail shops batch the pipe
designated for bending due to the long machine change over times. Therefore, although
the pipe was available for bending, it was not bent until enough pipe with the same
diameter was pulled into the shop to justify machine change over. Therefore, bending
operation batching caused a delay in detail fabrication completion, which resulted in the
large assembly fabrication delays. Bending operation batching caused 5 assemblies to be
fabricated late in respect to the ship need date.
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7.5 Fabrication Duration
Eight out of seventy eight analyzed assemblies, which represent 10% of all late
assemblies in Figure 7-1, were late due to the underestimated fabrication duration. Five
assemblies and three details, which caused assembly fabrication completion delay, were
late due to the underestimated fabrication duration.
Table 7.5.1 Fabrication Duration
Assembly Assembly Delivery
Fabrication Fabrication Date
Start Date Finish Date
Planned 3/13/ XX 4/17/ XX 4/24/ XX*
Actual 3/14/XX 7/18/XX 7/21/XX
* Planned delivery date is the ship need date
No material problems are experienced and the fabrication started earlier than planned,
however fabrication finish occurred later than planned. Fabrication duration is
underestimated by 81 days. The same logic was used to evaluate detail fabrication
underestimation for those details that caused the assembly fabrication completion to be
late.
7.6 Late Purchase Order Placement, Late Supplier Delivery, Lost Material, Other
Eighteen assemblies' fabrication was completed late due to late purchase order
placement, late supplier delivery, lost material, and other. The examples below show the
details of the analysis.
Six assemblies, which represent 8% of all late assemblies in Figure 7-1, were
completed late due to the untimely purchase order placement and material delivery.
Table 7.6.1 Purchase Order Placement and Material Delivery
PO Lead Material Assembly Assembly Delivery
Placement Time Receipt Fabrication Fabrication De
Date (day) Date Start Date Finish Date
Planned 6/5/ XX 300 4/1/XX+l 4/4/ XX+1 7/18/ XX+1 X 8/18/
Actual 155 7/29/ XX+1 9/29/ XX+1
*_Panne XX l dIsth ship Ieeddate XX+1
*Planned delivery date is the ship need date
70
In the example above, the valve caused the assembly fabrication delay. A valve PO was
placed on 1/13/XX+I with the supplier provided lead time of 300 days. The valve PO
should have been placed on 6/5/XX in order to receive the material to meet the assembly
fabrication start date. The remaining material needed to start assembly fabrication was
available prior to the valve's arrival date. Therefore, the valve was the bottleneck for the
assembly fabrication start. Late PO placement is not the root cause, however no systems
exist to determine whether the problem originated in sourcing or engineering. Six
assemblies were completed late due to the late purchase order placement.
Six assemblies, which represent 8% of all late assemblies in Figure 7-1, were
completed late due to the untimely material delivery by the supplier.
Table 7.6.2 Supplier Delivery Timeline
PO Lead Material Planned Planned
Placement Time Receipt FAbt Fabrica tin Delivery Date
Start Date Finish Date
Planned 6/11/XX 270 3/8/XX+1 10/12/XX+1 11/18/XX+1 11/25/XX+l*
Actual 6/11/XX 525 11/18/ 3/19/XX+2 7/10/XX+2 7/14/XX+2
* Planned delivery date is the ship need date
Material should have been received on 3/8/XX+1 with the PO placement date of 6/1 1/XX
and the lead time of 270 days. Material arrived at the shipyard's inspection station on
11/18/XX+1, 255 days later than the scheduled delivery date. Therefore, the supplier was
not able to deliver the material in a timely manner, which resulted in the assembly
fabrication delay. A total of six assemblies were delayed due to the late supplier delivery.
Four assemblies, which represent 5% of all late assemblies in Figure 7-1, were
completed late due to lost material.
Table 7.6.3 Lost Material
Missing
Material Assembly Assembly
Assembly Fabrication Fabrication Delivery
Shop Receipt Start Date Finish Date Date
Date II
Planned 3/10/XX 3/13/XX 4/17/XX 4/24/XX*
Actual 7/17/XX 2/14/XX 7/17/XX 7/22/XX
* Planned delivery date is the ship need date
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In the example shown above, all the material was available by 1/24/XX with the exception
of the valve that became available on 7/17/XX. The shipyard valve receipt date is not
available in SAP, however, the valve was received by the shop and the assembly was
completed and released to the ship. Although the system does not specify what happened
to the valve, the MRP controller and shop controller, who investigated the issue, indicate in
their notes that the valve was lost. The assembly was completed as soon as the valve
arrived, which indicates that the valve was the bottleneck against the timely assembly
fabrication completion. Similar scenario is seen in a total of four assemblies or its details.
The remaining 3 assemblies out of 78 analyzed, which represent 4% of all late
assemblies in Figure 7-1, were late due to various reasons. Two out of the three
assemblies experienced a delay of six months to a year when being passed down between
the production and MRP controllers. The delay can be attributed to human error, since
neither controller was able to explain the phenomenon. The occurrence of such a delay is
very infrequent therefore it is not concentrated on at this time. The last assembly analyzed
was late to an unknown reason. Examination of all the information and material flow
associated with this assembly did not point to the root cause of the late assembly
fabrication completion.
7.7 SAP System Problems
The majority of the data covered and analyzed in this thesis is extracted from SAP. In
the process of information gathering, numerous problems and discrepancies with the
information stored in SAP have been discovered. This section summarizes these issues.
A number of assemblies and details had information discrepancies between the
production order and the transfer order displays. The production order display shows all
the fabrication operations an assembly or detail has to undergo as well as the material list
needed for fabrication. The transfer order display shows the material flow from the
warehouses to the designated shop for an assembly or detail. All the material sent from the
warehouses to the shops is expected to match the material list in the production order
display for a particular assembly or detail. The information for numbers of details and
assemblies was found to be mismatched between the two displays. Thus it is not possible
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to determine if the needed material did not arrive to the shop or the material was not
needed and was not removed from SAP.
The production order display also shows the start and end dates for operations for an
assembly or detail. Finish dates for some operations in SAP exceed the actual finish dates.
For example, a transfer order display shows that a detail left the detail shop on 9/2/XX
however one of the operation steps in the detail shop associated with the detail was
completed on 11/5/XX. Since the assembly, which incorporates the detail, has been
completed on 10/25/XX, it is not possible for the detail's operation step to be completed
after the assembly completion date. The transfer order display has a similar issue as the
production order display. For example, a flow of ten pieces of material, some loose and
some details, are captured in SAP. The system shows that the last fitting arrived on
7/8/XX, however the assembly completion date is 5/8/2003. It is not possible for the
fitting to arrive to the shop after the assembly fabrication, which incorporates the fitting, is
completed. Thus, at times SAP reflects inaccurate dates.. Since the dates are entered into
the system by shop personnel, operators need to ensure timely and accurate data entry. Bar
codes can assist with maintaining accurate data input, however the shops currently don't
have the barcode capabilities. The shipyard adapted SAP system recently and has not been
able to transfer bar coding system to SAP from the legacy system at this time.
Another problem was found when looking at the document structure display. One of
the features of this part of SAP shows all the drawing numbers and inspection report
numbers associated with a particular assembly. Numerous assemblies have incomplete
lists of drawings and the inspection reports shown on the document structure display.
Thus, at times SAP reflects inaccurate information. Engineers and planners who link this
information in SAP need to ensure that all the information is entered into the system.
Order history for purchase order display does not reflect all the material coming into
the shipyard. For example, one assembly was missing a valve for six months.
Examination of the purchase order system showed that the valve PO was placed on
10/23/XX with the expected delivery date of 4/25/XX+1. Order history for the purchase
order display showed no record of the valve receipt by the shipyard. However, the
assembly, which incorporated the valve, was delivered to the assembly shop on 7/8/XX+1
and the assembly fabrication was completed on 10/25/XX+1. Thus, it is not possible to
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determine when the valve was received or determine its origin. Therefore, the sourcing
department and material inspectors should ensure the entry of all the data for all the
purchase orders.
Inventory levels are not used in identifying warehouse stock outs due to the lack of
historic data as mentioned in Section 7.2. For example, one of the assemblies was
determined to be late due to the fitting warehouse depletion of rings. The PO for the rings
was placed on 4/28/XX and material was received on 5/20/XX. The transfer order display
shows that 6 rings were ordered on 5/30/XX and production order display shows that 6
rings were needed for assembly fabrication. Table 7.7.1 displays the actual stock levels
and order history for the ring as shown in SAP.
Table 7.7.1 SAP Stock List
Requested/Required Available Quantity
Date Description Quantity (Each) (Each)
11/20/XX Stock 80
11 /20/XX Safety Stock -15 65
6/9/XX Order Reservation -4 61
Information shown in Table 7.7.1 has been downloaded on I 1/20/XX. The actual stock
and safety stock levels are shown on the date the download of the information occurs.
SAP stock list shows that only 4 rings, as opposed to the actual 6, were ordered around the
date when the ring release request for the assembly was placed at the warehouse. SAP
does not show the order reservation date of 5/30/XX, but shows 6/9/XX, which is close to
the original order reservation date. Also, SAP stock list does not reflect the actual receipt
date of 5/20/XX for 80 rings as order history purchase order display indicates. Without the
knowledge of the stock replenishment date, it is difficult to determine when the stockout
occurs. The same scenario occurred when analyzing other assemblies. Thus, SAP stock
display does not reflect all the information in respect to the order history and could not be
used for the root cause analysis.
Resolution of the majority of the issues with SAP lies in tighter control of the system
and ensuring careful, timely, and accurate data entry.
Value stream analysis traced root causes into engineering, fabrication shops, planning,
warehouses, and sourcing. Warehouse stockouts, detail shop loading variability, drawing
revisions, and underestimated assembly and detail fabrication durations caused 75% of the
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delays. Recommendations to eliminate the problems causing the assembly fabrication
delays are provided in Section 9. General methodology for conducting a value stream map
is described in Section 8.
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8. Methodology for Conducting Value Stream Maps
A general approach to enterprise level value stream mapping is described in this
section. Approaches to understanding the organization, identifying waste and data sources,
performing analyses, and methods to information verification are discussed in this section.
Also, the differences between lean in mass and low volume manufacturing are addressed.
Some information used in this section is based on the experience obtained in the shipyard
during the enterprise level value stream mapping process described in this thesis. Other
information is obtained from various sources of literature and research on value stream
mapping.
8.1 Understanding the Organization
The first and key step to enterprise value stream mapping is understanding the
organization. The organization is shaped by the type of products it manufactures, the type
of services it provides, its customers, and the customers' needs. The concentration of this
thesis has revolved around one of the shipyard's products: new aircraft carriers. The goal
is to deliver a quality product in a timely manner. In order for the ship to be built on time,
all the material and information supporting the manufacturing and construction needs to
occur without delay. Considering the number of steps the material and information have to
go through prior to reaching the platen and the dry dock, the further upstream the problem
occurs, the greater the delay in the final construction phase due to the bullwhip effect.
At the beginning of the internship, the intern received a two day shipyard-wide tour to
get a general understanding of the shops and various operations occurring in the shipyard.
This assisted with comprehension of the enterprise-wide view of the processes and
organization prior to starting the project and concentrating on one part of the operations
concerned with pipe assemblies.
The start of the value stream mapping effort should occur at the end of the process
where the product is completed and traced back upstream. (Rother and Shook, 1999) At
the time when the project described in this thesis started, Assembly I's details were being
fabricated in the copper and steel pipe shops. The intern spent approximately a week
learning the operations of the detail shops. Observation of the various detail fabrication,
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speaking with welders, fabricators, and line supervisors provided a number of different
perspectives on the processes, systems, and problems occurring in the shops. After the
detail shop orientation was complete, the intern started piecing the map by traveling up the
value stream. At each process step, it was determined who are the immediate customers
and suppliers and contact names of the personnel working in those departments who were
associated with the Assembly I. Once the process was traced to the suppliers, the intern
traced the assembly downstream as it was being fabricated. Unfortunately, the assembly
did not get installed on the platen by the time the internship was completed, therefore there
are no values associated with the platen and dry dock construction on the value stream
map.
The creation process of the enterprise value stream map needs to be concentrated on
the overall processes without getting lost in the operational details of each process step.
Interviews conducted with the personnel from each department provide an understanding
of the general functions. Providing the background of the project and ensuring the
understanding of the level of details necessary to complete the project to the interviewees
assists with ensuring the right amount of the information is provided. It is easy go get
sidetracked on various operational details for each process step, however this falls outside
of the project's scope. Once the enterprise value stream map is completed, major gaps
become apparent. Problem identification requires exploration of the operational details of
the process steps where the major gaps are found. The value stream map shown in Exhibit
3 is created based on the information obtained by drilling one level deeper than shown in
the VSM. The high level value stream map shown in Exhibit 2 was created based on the
detailed value stream map shown in Exhibit 3. It is critical to maintain the focus on the
enterprise as a whole when creating an enterprise level value stream map.
The key to understanding an organization is understanding the people who work in the
organization. Richard Welnick (2001) created a value stream map for the Ford Motor
Company's Wayne Assembly and Stamping Plant. One of the cultural issues addressed by
Richard is a strong presence of two unions that operate as two distinct entities in the same
facility. Richard found that understanding the factors that influence the company's current
environment, such as the culture, are crucial to the successful implementation of lean.
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The intern's initial introductions to the people who work in the shops were made by
people who are well-known and respected in the shipyard. When making contacts outside
the shops, the intern used the names of the people in the shops as referrals. One of the lean
enterprise principles mentioned in Section 3.1 is the existence of the relationships based on
mutual trust and commitment. (Murman, et al., 2002) The organization has not advanced
in its lean environment far enough to overcome the stigma of cross-functional silos.
Therefore, it was extremely helpful to have familiar representatives to set up the meetings.
Enterprise level value stream mapping effort cannot be successful without the willingness
to help, support of and the belief into the project of the people who work in the various
departments along the value stream.
8.2 Identifying waste
Knowledge of the organization, its customers and their needs is necessary in
identifying waste. Lean theory summarizes waste in seven categories as mentioned in
Section 3.3. The first step to identifying waste is performing a literature search to
determine the typical sources of waste found in various industries and applicable to
specific theories, such as lean.
All the waste categories described in Section 3.3 apply to the shipyard. The value
stream map captures the rework, which happens on numerous occasions in areas such as
planning and shops. Some of the rework is not apparent on the value stream map, but can
be easily discovered once an effort is made to determine the root cause of the long non-
value added times for various process steps. Also, the value stream map does not show if
the assemblies that are being fabricated are actually fabricated in the right time frame.
Fifty percent of the assemblies are fabricated early in respect to the ship need date and
therefore, create waste. Comparison of the assembly fabrication completion date and the
ship need date points out if the assembly is fabricated in timely manner.
One of the examples is the process that occurred in the assembly shop during
Assembly I's fabrication. Flanges were the last material to arrive to the assembly shop.
The flanges were late because the material was ordered late due to the engineering error.
The engineers did not notice that the flange needed for the assembly was atypical and the
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wrong flange was ordered. The mistake was identified late in the process and the purchase
order for the flange material was placed late. The flanges were needed in the assembly
shop when fabrication of the first half of the assembly was completed. The material for the
second half of the assembly was available, but was not able to be fabricated due to the lack
of flanges. The assembly shop made up dummy flanges to be used to complete the
assembly fabrication and later replaced by the real flanges. Fabrication, use, and disposal
of the dummy flanges were the labor and material wastes of rework due to an error. As the
result, Assembly I's fabrication was completed late in respect to the ship need date.
Production of unneeded goods is a large area of waste in the shipyard. Fifty percent of
all the assemblies fabricated in the shipyard are fabricated early to the ship need date
schedule. Misuse of the resources such as labor and material to fabricate assemblies that
are not needed creates waste since the assemblies that are needed are not being fabricated.
These assemblies significantly increase the in-process inventory, which creates large
carrying and overhead costs. Additionally, these assemblies might get damaged or start
rusting while sitting in the warehouses, which requires rework. Inventory excess can be
seen across the value stream of unneeded parts stored in the warehouse and in-process
material that is fabricated earlier than required.
Excessive processing steps and unnecessary people, material, and information
movement can be found at various steps along the value stream. One of the examples is
the five tiers of the planning process. Advanced planners are located approximately two
and a half miles away from grouping and grouping is located the same distance from
production planning. This spread of planners complicates problem resolution and creates
unnecessary movement of people and information.
Manufacturing products and rendering services, which do not meet customer's needs,
is another source of waste in the shipyard. One of the examples of such waste are pipe
templates. In order to determine the space constraints that a pipe has to fit into, templates
are created. The template could be a steel rod that is bent in the same manner as the pipe
needs to be bent. The template is bent on the ship and then transferred to the shop to be
used for a model during pipe bending. Once the pipe is bent, the template is discarded.
The template is not a product that the US Navy has requested, but it is used to build the
product for the customer, which is non-value added required.
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8.3 Differences between lean in high and low volume manufacturing
Application of the lean principles in high and low volume manufacturing environments
differs. In a high volume environment, cells are set up to create a one piece flow for the
similar families of products. In a low volume, high-mix manufacturing environment cells
are difficult to set up due to the high mix or variation of the product. In the shipyard, one
piece flow normally exists due to the nature of the pipe assemblies. Each assembly differs
by complexity, number of parts, and fabrication operations it undergoes. Therefore, it is
difficult to set up cells and create pipe families.
Process standardization is the basis of lean. Challenges associated with process
standardization in the shipyard considering the variety and complexity of products are
encountered on a daily basis. The copper and steel pipe shops attempt to standardize the
processes by dividing the details into families consisting of a small, medium, and large size
pipe. In the assembly shop, an assembly does not move during the fabrication with the
welders and fabricators rotation between different assemblies. A target tool has been
developed to standardize the fabrication processes, however the information captured in
the tool is not precise enough to use in the shops. The process steps where the information
such as drawings and work packages are created experience challenges with
standardization due to the amount of rework associated with each process step. Therefore,
it is challenging to standardize processes in the low volume manufacturing as opposed to
the high volume manufacturing due to the high variety of products.
In a low volume manufacturing environment, the overall top level cycle time reduction
is not necessarily the goal, however the cycle time reduction of individual processes is the
goal as described in Section 3.4. In high volume manufacturing, the majority of the time
the overall cycle time reduction is the goal.
Lean implementation in high and low volume manufacturing environments differs
greatly due to the differences in the products and the challenges associated with each
environment. However, number of lean principles can be implemented in the shipyard.
Specification of value and identification of value streams should occur. Flow and pull
should be established to ensure that all the departments are working to the same schedule
based on the ship need date. This will ensure fabrication of the right assemblies to allow
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timely ship construction completion. The process should always undergo improvements to
ensure perfection is achieved.
8.4 Data sources
Data sources for the creation of the value stream map vary across the value stream. All
the process steps that deal with the information, such as engineering and planning, provide
imprecise data regarding the touch times and the total times that are captured in the value
stream map. There are no systems in place to capture the exact durations for various
processes that work with information. The data were estimates gathered by interviewing
individuals from engineering, planning, and sourcing departments. Those individuals who
worked with the Assembly I were targeted. The majority of the individuals were able to
provide average durations, which were not necessarily associated with the Assembly I, for
various process steps. This created significant difficulties in determining the problems
encountered during those process steps, identifying root causes of the problems, their
effect on the assembly processing timeline, and providing suggestions to eliminate the
problems.
Majority of the information associated with the production shops and material flow
captured in the value stream map was extracted from SAP. The accuracy of the data
enables determination of the problems, their root causes, and problem elimination.
However, lack of some data in SAP, which is described in Section 7.7, increases the
difficulty of the analysis.
8.5 Analyses
The value stream map provides lead times and touch times for all the processes,
associated with the pipe assembly, across the enterprise. Value added ratio (VAR), which
is calculated by dividing the touch time by total cycle time for the particular process step,
shows which processes have the most non-value added time. VARs should be looked at in
the context of the process. For example, VAR for the material engineering department is
2.4%, which means that the information remains idle in this department a large portion of
the time. Examination of material engineers' functions -shows that the engineers have to
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communicate with the US Navy to receive an approval on the material changes and the
suppliers to ensure the material specifications are met. The majority of the non-value
added time is created by the actions that originate in the external sources such as lengthy
response time from the US Navy or the suppliers. Therefore, the overall supply chain
needs to be leaned out to enable the material engineering department to decrease the
amount of non-value added time in their process. Other processes such as the copper and
steel pipe shops with the VAR of approximately 1% should be examined closely, because
all the non-value added actions occur within upstream processes of the shipyard.
Understanding of the process and the functions performed by various departments is
critical in the analysis of the value stream. Operations of the processes with the lowest
VARs should be examined closely to determine the causes of the non-value added time.
Once the causes are identified, lean events should take place to eliminate the problems and
increase the VAR.
Processes where rework occurs are identified on the value stream map with the rework
sign such as design, production engineering, advance planning, grouping and production
planning. According to lean, rework is one of the wastes and should be eliminated
whenever possible.
Another part of the analysis consists of comparing different processes of the enterprise
that perform similar functions. One of the examples of such processes are copper and steel
pipe shops with VARs of 1% and 54%, respectively. In both shops the material undergoes
similar operation steps to be fabricated into details. The difference in VARs shows that
there is an issue in the copper pipe shop that does not exist to the same extent in the steel
pipe shop. The operations of the two shops need to be examined and the differences,
which cause VAR to be significantly lower in the copper pipe shop, should be found and
addressed.
The value stream map is a useful tool for identifying wastes in the system, pinpointing
the processes where the non-value added time is high and the areas where the lean efforts
should concentrate on.
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8.6 Verification
After the completion of the enterprise value stream map, the information and processes
captured need to be verified to check for accuracy.
The process flow captured in the VSM was identified from the interviews conducted
with the personnel from all the departments across the enterprise. VSM has been reviewed
by two experienced production engineers, who are very familiar with the processes in the
shipyard, in order to verify the process flow. Also, the VSM has been shown to the
majority of the personnel who were interviewed during the VSM creation process. The
feedback from all the individuals who reviewed the VSM has been addressed and
incorporated into the VSM. The information has been presented to the majority of upper
and middle management and those concerns that have been raised have been addressed.
Therefore, the process flow captured in the VSM has been visually verified through a
variety of sources.
The touch and cycle times for each process step has been verified through the
personnel interviewed or data captured in SAP. The touch and cycle times for the process
steps that deal with the information flow, starting with engineering and ending with
production control, are typical times therefore no other data could be captured to verify the
accuracy of the times provided. The data shown in the VSM for the material flow, starting
with the MRP controller and ending with the construction, is drawn out of the SAP. The
data for the material flow is verified by examining the durations of the material flow
process for the 78 assemblies, which were inspected closely to determine the problems that
caused the assemblies to be late. The data for the detail fabrication timeline and
information flow was verified by examining the planning and fabrication timeline for all
the details associated with the Assembly 1, which is equivalent to approximately 30 details.
The data associated with the longest fabrication timeline and lead time was captured in the
VSM. The assembly fabrication duration and information flow timeline was verified by
examining an additional 78 assemblies. Also, the representation of the Assembly I was
examined in Section 6. Therefore, all the touch and cycle time information captured in the
VSM has been verified and determined to be accurate.
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9. Recommendations and Conclusions
Recommendations for the elimination of some of the operational problems, suggestions
for future work, and general conclusions are provided in this section. The basis for the
recommendation implementation is the alignment of all the parties involved in the
enterprise value stream at all levels of the organization. The VSM is a useful tool to
ensure the common ground is reached between operators and managers.
9.1 Recommendations
Recommendations provided in this section are aimed at improving operational
effectiveness. Material ordering process reorganization, detail shop loading variability
elimination, engineering drawing revisions and planning process minimization are
described here.
9.1.1 Material Ordering Process Reorganization
Examination of the high level value stream map shows that one of the largest time gaps
occurs during the last two tiers of the planning process, the MRP and shop controllers.
Value added ratio (VAR) of 1.1 % (0.4/11) shows that a small amount of time is value
added. Fabrication of 28% of the assemblies was completed late due to the fitting/pipe
warehouse stock depletion. Examining the material order process that was described in
Section 5.2.2 shows that the process can be improved and the assembly fabrication delay
could be minimized and/or eliminated. Figure 9-1 captures the part of the stocked material
ordering process where one of the issues lies. The situation portrayed here is applicable for
the stocked material only. Material assigned to a particular project is unique and does not
experience the issues discussed here.
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Figure 9-1: Material Ordering Process
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MRP controller releases the available job list (Step 1) to the shop controllers only when all
the material is available for copper and steel pipe shops and when partial material is
available for the assembly shop. The intention to order material emerges when the shop
controller decides to start fabrication of an assembly or a detail by placing a request to the
MRP controller to release the work package and initiate the material flow by reserving
material. Once a work package and material release request is placed, the shop controller
plans the work force requirements and floor allocation for the fabrication of the particular
assembly or detail. The shop controller is expecting a timely material arrival to the shop.
The transfer order (TO), which initiates the fitting flow, enters into the fitting warehouse
TO queue. Two to five days might pass prior to the fitting warehouse operator pulling the
material for the particular TO. Therefore the MRP controller at Step 1 checks material
availability and material is reserved for the assembly or detail at Step 5. On average, a
time gap of up to three weeks occurs between the intention to order the material and the
material's arrival at the shop, because the warehouse is allowed three weeks for material
delivery if no problems are encountered. During this time, the reserved material could be
reassigned to another assembly or detail or withdrawn from the warehouse for another
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project. At the time when the fitting warehouse operator pulls the stocked material for the
designated assembly or detail, no material is available. Historically, this happens more
frequently with the fittings than with the pipe. The shop controller knows that the fitting is
available for the assembly fabrication only when the fitting arrives at the shop.
Reservation of the fitting does not provide assurance of fitting's availability due to the
possibility of the fitting's reassignment to another assembly.
Time gap elimination between the intention to order material in Step 1 and the material
order placement in Step 5 ensures the material needed for the particular assembly or detail
stays available and is not assigned to another assembly, detail, or project. The shop
controller and not the MRP controller should reserve the needed material in SAP at Step 2
to eliminate the time gap and ensure the material is reserved for the particular assembly or
detail prior to floor, labor, and machine time allocation. The reserved material should not
be reassigned to a different assembly, detail or project. The process of the material
reservation in SAP takes approximately 1 minute and is currently being performed by the
warehouse operators. Therefore, the SAP system does not need to be altered and only the
reservation function transfers from the MRP controller to the shop controller. The needed
material might become unavailable between the time the MRP controller releases the
information associated with an assembly or detail in the available job list (Step 1) and the
shop controller decides to start the fabrication. If this occurs, the shop controller will know
not to allocate the work force and floor space to the particular assembly or detail due to the
material unavailability.
Material order process reorganization allows the shop controller to order the pipe and
fittings at the same time, since the fittings are reserved and delivered to the shop in a
timely manner. This reduces the material ordering process by a week and decreases the
process from ten to seven steps. Figure 9-2 shows the material ordering process after the
reorganization.
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Figure 9-2: Material Ordering Process after Reorganization
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The following are the benefits of the material ordering process reorganization.
-Reduction in number of detail and assembly fabrication delays due to stock
material unavailaiability
Elimination of the time gap between fitting and pipe order placement
- Assistance with factually determining stock inventory issues
-Aligned with the goal 'having 100% of material for 98% work packages' created
by the Vice President of Operations.
9.1.2 Detail Shop Loading Variability Elimination
Fabrication of 22% of the assemblies was late due to the late arrival of the details
because of the detail shop loading variability. Three main reasons caused the detail
fabrication to be completed late: time gap between the fitting and pipe order placement
(35%), late material pull (35%), and bending operation batching effect (30%).
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Copper and steel pipe shop controllers receive fittings and theoretically should order
pipe on the day when the fittings are received. In the case of the late details for 35% of the
assemblies, the shop controllers waited for at least a week prior to ordering pipe. The type
of pipe needed for the detail fabrication was available in the pipe warehouse. The delay in
pipe ordering caused the detail fabrication to be started and completed late, delaying the
assembly fabrication completion in respect to the ship need date.
In the case of the late material pull, copper and steel pipe shop controllers did not
request the material for the detail fabrication in a timely manner. All the material needed
for the fabrication was available in the warehouses. The detail shops did not complete
detail fabrication on time for the assembly shop to be able to complete the assembly
fabrication in respect to the ship need date.
The third reason, bending operation batching effect, occurs in the detail shops when the
pipe needs to undergo the bending process. Changeover times for the bending machine are
extensive and the operators try to minimize the number of changeovers. The shop
controller pulls in the details for fabrication that include a similar diameter pipe to ensure
that all the pipe will get bent without changing the setting on the bending machine. This
creates a problem where some details are fabricated early while other details are fabricated
late. The late details delay the assembly fabrication completion in respect to the ship need
date.
The underlying problem that results in the detail shop loading variability is the lack of
the target date for the detail shops to work towards. The assembly shop works toward the
ship need date and the detail shops should work towards the assembly shop need date.
Production planners determine the assembly shop need date through the simulation
performed in SAP. However, this date is overridden in the system once the detail shops
provide new fabrication dates as described in Section 5.3.1. Currently, the detail shops are
measured on completing the detail fabrication within the planned fabrication duration. A
matrix should be put in place where the detail shops' success is measured based on the
number of details completed that meet the assembly shop need date. Detail shop
controllers overestimate planned fabrication durations because they cannot rely on the
timely material delivery. Overestimated planned fabrication durations introduce a lot of
slack into the value stream. Provision of the assembly shop need date to the detail shops,
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development of a matrix, and reorganization of the material ordering process as suggested
in Section 9.1 .1, will eliminate the detail shop loading variability and reduce the slack in
the value stream.
9.1.3 Engineering Drawing Revisions and Planning Process Minimization
Fabrication of 15% of the assemblies was late in respect to the ship need date due to
the engineering drawing revision late release. The detailed analysis of the engineering
drawing revision effect is described in Section 7.3. Placement of an experienced operator,
who is responsible for checking the accuracy of the drawing prior to its release, in the
engineering department would decrease the amount of drawings needing revision.
Concurrent engineering should be practiced to ensure the quality of the drawing is high
prior to its release to the downstream processes.
The value stream map captures the information flow through five planning functions.
A large amount of rework occurs between the first three tiers of the planning process,
where VAR is 5.6%, as described in Section 5.2. Currently, advanced and production
planning departments are located approximately two miles from grouping department as
shown in Exhibit 4. The distance increases the delay for the rework completion. All three
departments should be co-located to ensure fast problem resolution. Further research
needs to be done to determine if production planning and grouping could be combined into
one process step.
Information rework is not given the priority status in the planning process, therefore
there is no time constraint imposed for fixing the information problems. A definite
timeline should be established for rework to ensure the problems are resolved in timely
manner and do not affect the fabrication timeline in the pipe shops.
The recommendations provided in this section are targeted at making sure the
information and material arrives to the assembly shop in timely manner to make certain the
assembly shop completes the assembly to meet the ship need date.
90
9.2 Future Work
During the process of conducting research for this thesis some suggestions for the
future work have been generated and are presented in this section.
Some of the operational issues identified in the shipyard are based on the material
availability. The shipyard is in a unique position where the variability due to the external
customer demand does not exist. The US Navy requires one aircraft carrier to be built in a
five-year time frame. Eight percent of the variability, as shown in Figure 7-1, is caused
externally by the late supplier material delivery. Majority of the material demand and
variability is internal to the shipyard. Considering the fact that the shipyard has already
constructed a number of aircraft carriers in the previous years, it should be possible to look
at the historical data to identify the material demand at various stages of the aircraft carrier
construction. It will be difficult to estimate the exact inventory levels since no two aircraft
carriers are the same however an estimate should greatly improve the inventory
management at the shipyard.
Another suggestion for the future work is to study metrics and the behavior driven by
these matrices across the enterprise. For example, the assembly shop is tasked with
completing the fabrication of a specific quantity of assemblies in a year. In order to reach
this goal, the assembly shop fabricates assemblies ahead of schedule, which is a waste
according to the lean theory. These assemblies increase the in-process inventory, carrying
costs, and overhead if rework is necessary due to damage or loss of the assemblies.
Matrices that measure success in each department across the enterprise should be aligned
and aimed at the goal of constructing a quality ship in a timely manner.
A study of the effect of the rework in the planning process can uncover opportunities
for improvement, cycle time decrease, and rework minimization. Probabilities of the work
packages and drawings being returned for rework to engineering, advance planning,
grouping, and production planning should be examined as shown in Figure 9-3.
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Figure 9-3: Rework Effects
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Improvement opportunities to reduce cycle times by eliminating rework of information can
be significant and should be studied extensively. As Figure 9-3 shows, probabilities (p) of
the information moving forward along the value stream from engineering to production
planning and probabilities (1 -p) of the information being reworked should be determined
by tracking selected work packages. This will provide a full understanding of the rework
impact on the value stream.
An effort should be undertaken to ensure the proper and efficient use of the SAP
system. Incentives should be put in place to make certain all the information is accurately
entered into the system. One critical issue is an accurate maintenance of the inventory
stock levels in various warehouses. This will enable the shipyard to perform historical
studies to identify the correct inventory levels.
Department locations shown in Exhibit 4 should be carefully studied to ensure that the
personnel from various departments who work closely with each other are co-located. This
will ensure that non-value added time associated with information or material movement
across long distances and personnel communication barriers are minimized.
Suggestions provided in this section need further investigation. There is a large
opportunity in improvement with the careful study and analysis of the inventory levels,
matrices, incentives, and rework.
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9.3 Conclusions
Three main conclusions can be drawn from this project: 1. Enterprise value stream
mapping is an effective tool in identifying waste; 2. Environment for lean needs to be
created on the enterprise level; 3. Implementation of lean in low volume, high-mix
manufacturing environment generates more challenges than a high volume, low mix
manufacturing environment. Each is described below.
1. Enterprise value stream mapping is an effective tool in identifying waste.
The enterprise value stream map shows the touch and cycle time for each process step
associated with the pipe assembly chosen as a basis for the map. The steps that have the
smallest value added ratios represent the process steps with the least amount of the value
added and the most amount of the non-value added time. Examination of the internal
operational processes of the areas uncovers the sources of the waste and provides
opportunities for improvement. The value stream map also shows the amount of rework
that occurs at the various steps of the enterprise. Rework creates significant delays and
affects the processes downstream, therefore the company should strive towards the
elimination of rework. The enterprise value stream map is useful in uncovering the
'hidden factory' for elimination of non-value added activities. The enterprise level value
stream mapping is an effective tool in identifying and prioritizing the areas in the
enterprise where lean should be applied.
2. Environment for lean needs to be created on the enterprise level.
The enterprise value stream map showed extensive interaction and interrelation of all the
processes in the enterprise. Implementing lean on the department level can lead to sub-
optimization and affects the processes downstream.
"Cross-functional teamwork is critical to lean transformations and requires the removal
of barriers between complimentary functions. Strong leadership in this area is critical
to the establishment of cross-functional linkages. Focus on the products vice the
functions is the desired effect which requires the removal of the Not-Invented-Here
(NIH) mentality so that a cross-functional organizational structure can support the
organization's common goal." (Shields, et al., 1997)
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Departmental and functional silos need to be broken down, thus allowing the optimization
of the processes on the enterprise level. The enterprise value stream map ensures the
alignment of all the parties involved in the enterprise value stream at all levels of the
organization. Once the common ground is established, the lean implementation should
occur while taking into consideration all the departments and processes and work towards
the same goal of constructing a quality ship in a timely manner.
3. Implementation of lean in low volume, high-mix manufacturing environment
generates more challenges than high volume, low mix manufacturing environment.
Lean principles, which were developed in a high volume manufacturing environment, need
to be selectively and carefully applied in a low volume, high-mix manufacturing
environment. The goals set for reaching lean in the two environments differ somewhat.
While in high volume environment one of the goals is to reduce the overall top level cycle
time, in the shipyard one of the goals is to reduce the cycle times of individual process
steps without reducing the overall cycle time of the product. Both high and low volume
environments have some goals in common and implement lean to reduce costs and
improve efficiencies and flexibilities of the processes. Therefore, implementation of lean
in a low volume, high mix manufacturing environment, such as the shipyard, should be
approached with care and the principles should be applied selectively.
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Exhibit 1: Value Stream Mapping Icon List
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Exhibit 2: High Level Enterprise Value Stream Map
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Exhibit 3: Enterprise Value Stream Map
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Exhibit 4: Information and Material Flow Across the Shipyard
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